A04
Biases and Decision Impairments in Markets
Discussion Papers

Discussion Paper No. 471
December 9, 2023

Motivated Procrastination

Author:

Charlotte Cordes (LMU Munich)
Jana Friedrichsen (Kiel University, CESifo)
Simeon Schudy (Ulm University, CESifo)

Abstract:

Traditionally, economic models have attributed procrastination to present bias. However, procrastination may also arise when individuals derive anticipatory utility from holding motivated, overly optimistic beliefs about the workload they need to complete. This study provides a rigorous empirical test for this notion of `motivated procrastination'. In a longitudinal experiment over four weeks, individuals have to complete a cumbersome task of unknown length. They are exposed to exogenous variation in i) their expectation regarding their workload and ii) scope for motivated reasoning. We find that scope for motivated reasoning allows workers to hold substantially more optimistic beliefs and identify a causal link between the exogenous variation in beliefs and the deferral of work to the future. This systematic belief-based delay of work (motivated procrastination) turns out to be robust to accounting for decision-makers' time preferences and emotional responses, and looms largest for decision makers who tend to not acquire information that may include negative news.

Keywords:

anticipatory utility; beliefs; memory; motivated cognition; procrastination; real effort; task allocation;

JEL-Classification:

C91; D83; D84; D90; D91;

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Discussion Paper No. 468
November 30, 2023

The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks

Author:

Florian Englmaier (LMU Munich, CEPR, CESifo)
Stefan Grimm (LMU Munich)
Dominik Grothe (LMU Munich)
David Schindler (Tilburg University, CESifo)
Simeon Schudy (Ulm University, CESifo)

Abstract:

Despite the prevalence of non-routine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is understood regarding how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a series of field experiments involving more than 5,000 participants, we investigate how incentives alter behavior in teams working on such a task. We document a positive effect of bonus incentives on performance, even among teams with strong intrinsic motivation. Bonuses also transform team organization by enhancing the demand for leadership. Exogenously increasing teams' demand for leadership results in performance improvements comparable to those seen with bonus incentives, rendering it as a likely mediator of incentive effects.

Keywords:

team work; bonus; incentives; leadership; non-routine; exploration;

JEL-Classification:

C92; C93; J33; D03; M52;

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Discussion Paper No. 466
November 29, 2023

Commitment Requests Do Not Affect Truth-Telling in Laboratory and Online Experiments

Author:

Tobias Cagala (Deutsche Bundesbank)
Ulrich Glogowsky (University of Linz)
Johannes Rincke (University of Erlangen-Nuremberg)
Simeon Schudy (Ulm University)

Abstract:

Using a standard cheating game, we investigate whether the request to sign a no-cheating declaration affects truth-telling. Our design varies the content of a no-cheating declaration (reference to ethical behavior vs. reference to possible sanctions) and the type of experiment (online vs. offline). Irrespective of the declaration's content, commitment requests do not affect truth-telling, neither in the laboratory nor online. The inefficacy of commitment requests appears robust across different samples and does not depend on psychological measures of reactance.

Keywords:

cheating; lying; truth-telling; compliance; commitment; no-cheating rule; no-cheating declaration; commitment request;

JEL-Classification:

C91; C93; D03;

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Discussion Paper No. 464
November 27, 2023

Comparing Crowdfunding Mechanisms: Introducing the Generalized Moulin-Shenker Mechanism

Author:

Andrej Woerner (LMU Munich)
Sander Onderstal (University of Amsterdam , Tinbergen Institute)
Arthur Schram (University of Amsterdam, Tinbergen Institute)

Abstract:

For reward-based crowdfunding, we introduce the strategy-proof Generalized Moulin-Shenker mechanism (GMS) and compare its performance to the prevailing All-Or-Nothing mechanism (AON). Theoretically, GMS outperforms AON in equilibrium profit and funding success. We test these predictions experimentally, distinguishing between a sealed-bid and a dynamic version of GMS. We find that the dynamic GMS outperforms the sealed-bid GMS. It performs better than AON when the producer aims at maximizing funding success. For crowdfunding in practice, this suggests that the current standard of financing projects may be improved upon by implementing a crowdfunding mechanism that is similar to the dynamic GMS.

Keywords:

JEL-Classification:

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Discussion Paper No. 460
November 21, 2023

Cournot Meets Bayes-Nash: A Discontinuity in Behavior in Finitely Repeated Duopoly Games

Author:

Cédric Argenton (CentER & TILEC, Tilburg University)
Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel (TU Berlin)
Wieland Müller (VCEE, University of Vienna, CentER & TILEC, Tilburg University)

Abstract:

We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our treatments include markets with (a) complete cost symmetry and complete information, (b) slight cost asymmetry and complete information, and (c) varying cost asymmetries and incomplete information. For the case of complete cost symmetry and complete information, our data confirm the well-known result that duopoly players achieve, on average, partial collusion. However, as soon as any level of cost asymmetry or incomplete information is introduced, observed average individual quantities are remarkably close to the static Bayes-Nash equilibrium predictions.

Keywords:

Cournot; Bayesian game; Bayes-Nash equilibrium; repeated games; collusion; cooperation; experimental economics;

JEL-Classification:

D43; L13; C72; C92;

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Discussion Paper No. 410
July 18, 2023

Does Unfairness Hurt Women? The Effects of Losing Unfair Competitions

Author:

Stefano Piasenti (HU Berlin)
Marica Valente (University of Innsbruck)
Roel van Veldhuizen (Lund University)
Gregor Pfeifer (University of Sydney)

Abstract:

How do men and women differ in their persistence after experiencing failure in a competitive environment? We tackle this question by combining a large online experiment (N=2,086) with machine learning. We find that when losing is unequivocally due to merit, both men and women exhibit a significant decrease in subsequent tournament entry. However, when the prior tournament is unfair, i.e., a loss is no longer necessarily based on merit, women are more discouraged than men. These results suggest that transparent meritocratic criteria may play a key role in preventing women from falling behind after experiencing a loss.

Keywords:

competitiveness; gender; fairness; machine learning; online experiment;

JEL-Classification:

C90; D91; J16; C14;

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Discussion Paper No. 392
March 30, 2023

Rebate Rules in Reward-Based Crowdfunding: Introducing the Bid-Cap Rule

Author:

Fabian Gerstmeier (HU Berlin)
Yigit Oezcelik (University of Liverpool)
Michel Tolksdorf (TU Berlin)

Abstract:

We study the efficacy of rebate rules in reward-based crowdfunding, where a project is only realized when a funding goal is met, and only those who pledge at least a reservation price receive a reward from the project. We propose and experimentally test two rebate rules against the customary all-or-nothing model. Firstly, we adapt the proportional rebate rule from threshold public good games to our reward-based setting. Secondly, we develop the novel bid-cap rule. Here, pledges must only be paid up to a cap, which is determined ex-post such that the provision point is exactly met. Theoretically, the bid-cap rule induces weakly less variance in payments compared with the proportional rebate rule. In our experiment, we find that both rebate rules induce higher pledges and increase the project realization rate in comparison to the all-or-nothing model. Further, we can confirm that the variance of payments is lower under the bid-cap rule compared with the proportional rebate rule.

Keywords:

crowdfunding; laboratory experiment; provision point mechanism; rebates;

JEL-Classification:

C72; C92; H41;

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Discussion Paper No. 382
February 14, 2023

Risk, Reward and Uncertainty in Buyer-Seller Transactions - The Seller's View on Combining Posted Prices and Auctions -

Author:

Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel (TU Berlin)
Sabine Kröger (Laval University, Quebec)

Abstract:

In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature almost exclusively looks at buyers in such combined mechanisms, the current paper summarizes results from the sellers' point of view. Buy-It-Now auctions are complex mechanisms and therefore quite challenging for sellers. The paper discusses the seller's curse, a bias that sellers might fall prey to in such combined mechanisms, and how experience counterbalances this bias. Furthermore, the paper explores the role of information and bargaining power on behavior and profit prospects in Buy-It-Now auctions.

Keywords:

asymmetric information; laboratory experiment; field experiment; auction; BIN-auction; Buy-It-Now auction; BIN-price; Buy-It-Now price; combined mechanism;

JEL-Classification:

C72; C91; D44; D82; L1;

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Discussion Paper No. 359
January 4, 2023

Time Pressure and Regret in Sequential Search

Author:

Felix Klimm (LMU Munich, CESifo)
Martin G. Kocher (University of Vienna, CESifo, University of Gothenburg)
Timm Opitz (MPI, LMU Munich)
Simeon Schudy (LMU Munich, CESifo)

Abstract:

Perceived urgency and regret are common in many sequential search processes; for example, sellers often pressure buyers in search of the best offer, both time-wise and in terms of potential regret of forgoing unique purchasing opportunities. theoretically, these strategies result in anticipated and experienced regret, which systematically affect search behavior and thereby distort optimal search. In addition, urgency may alter decision-making processes and thereby the salience of regret. To understand the empirical relevance of these aspects, we study the causal effects of regret, urgency, and their interaction on search behavior in a pre-registered, theory-based, and well-powered experiment. Empirically, we and that anticipated regret does not affect search behavior either with or without time pressure, while experienced regret leads to systematic adjustments in search length. Urgency reduces decision times and perceived decision quality, but does not generally alter search length. Only very inexperienced decision-makers buy earlier when pressured. Thus, consumer protection measures against pressure selling tactics can help inexperienced consumers in particular.

Keywords:

sequential search; time pressure; regret; anticipated regret; experienced regret;

JEL-Classification:

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Discussion Paper No. 358

Cross-game Learning and Cognitive Ability in Auctions

Author:

Thomas Giebe (Linnaeus University)
Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel (TU Berlin)
Martin G. Kocher (University of Vienna, CESifo, University of Gothenburg)
Simeon Schudy (LMU Munich, CESifo)

Abstract:

Overbidding in sealed-bid second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use first-price auctions (FPAs) to expose participants to an auction format in which losses from high bids are more salient than in SPAs. Experience in FPAs causes substantial cross-game learning for cognitively less able participants but does not affect overbidding for the cognitively more able. Vice versa, experiencing SPAs before bidding in an FPA does not substantially affect bidding behavior by the cognitively less able but, somewhat surprisingly, reduces bid shading by cognitively more able participants, resulting in lower profits in FPAs. Thus, 'cross-game learning' may rather be understood as 'cross-game transfer', as it has the potential to benefit bidders with lower cognitive ability whereas it has little or even adverse effects for higher-ability bidders.

Keywords:

cognitive ability; cross-game learning; cross-game transfer; experiment; auction; heuristics; first-price auctions; second-price auctions;

JEL-Classification:

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