Dimakopoulos, Philipp D. (Humboldt University Berlin)
Heller, C.-Philipp (Humboldt University Berlin)
We study the allocation of German lawyers to regional courts for legal trainee-ships. Because of excess demand in some regions lawyers often have to wait before being allocated. The currently used “Berlin” mechanism is not weakly Pareto efficient, does not eliminate justified envy and does not respect improvements. We introduce a mechanism based on the matching with contracts literature, using waiting time as the contractual term. The resulting mechanism is strategy-proof, weakly Pareto efficient, eliminates justified envy and respects improvements. We extend our proposed mechanism to allow for a more flexible allocation of positions over time.
many-to-one matching; matching with contracts; stability; slot-specific choice functions; waiting time; legal education
D47; D82; C78; H75; I28