B07
Regulation and Taxation of Financial Markets
Discussion Papers

Discussion Paper No. 426
September 15, 2023

Banking Crises under a Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC)

Author:

Lea Bitter (TU Berlin)

Abstract:

One of the main concerns associated with central bank digital currencies (CBDC) is the disintermediating effect on the banking sector in general, and the risk of bank runs in times of crisis in particular. This paper examines the implications of an interest-bearing CBDC on banking crises in a dynamic bank run model with a financial accelerator. The analysis distinguishes between bank failures due to illiquidity and due to insolvency. In a numerical exercise, CBDC leads to a reduction in the net worth of banks in normal times but mitigates the risk of a bank run in times of crisis. The financial stability implications also depend on how CBDC is accounted for on the asset side of the central bank balance sheet: if CBDC issuance is offset by asset purchases, it delays the onset of both types of bank failures to larger shocks. In contrast, if CBDC issuance is offset by loans to banks, it substantially impedes failures due to illiquidity, but only marginally affects bank failures due to insolvency.

Keywords:

central bank digital currency; financial intermediation; financial stability; bank runs;

JEL-Classification:

E42; E58; G01; G21;

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Discussion Paper No. 385
February 16, 2023

Non-Standard Errors*

Author:

Ciril Bosch-Rosa (TU Berlin)
Bernhard Kassner (LMU Munich)

Abstract:

In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data-generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence-generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty: Non-standard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for better reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer-review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.

Keywords:

uncertainty; standard errors; reproducibility; hypotheses;

JEL-Classification:

C13; C18; C10;

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Discussion Paper No. 375
January 27, 2023

Taming Overconfident CEOs Through Stricter Financial Regulation

Author:

Bernhard Kassner (LMU Munich)

Abstract:

A large body of literature finds that managerial overconfidence increases risk-taking by financial institutions. This paper shows that financial regulation can be effective at mitigating this type of risk. Exploiting regulatory changes introduced after the financial crisis as a natural experiment, I find that overconfidence-induced risk-taking decreases in financial institutions subject to stricter regulation. Following the easing of these regulations, overconfidence-induced risk-taking increases again. These findings confirm the effectiveness of financial regulation at correcting overconfident behavior, but also suggest that the impact fades away quickly once removed.

Keywords:

overconfidence; risk; regulation; financial sector;

JEL-Classification:

G28; G32; G38; G40;

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Discussion Paper No. 367
January 20, 2023

An Experimental Test of the Global-Game Selection in Coordination Games with Asymmetric Players

Author:

Frank Heinemann (TU Berlin)

Abstract:

In symmetric binary-choice coordination games, the global-game selection (GGS) has been proven to predict a high proportion of observed choices correctly. In these games, the GGS is identical to the best response to Laplacian beliefs about the fraction of players choosing either action. This paper presents an experiment on asymmetric games in which the GGS differs from the best response to Laplacian beliefs. It shows that the best response to Laplacian beliefs is a better predictor of behavior in these games than the GGS. In the considered games, the GGS provides poor guidance and also fails to give the right qualitative comparative statics predictions. Simple cognitive hierarchy models yield better predictions. The best response to a Laplacian belief about the distribution of other players' actions yields the best prediction. Comparing maximum likelihood estimates for four probabilistic models shows that an estimated global-game equilibrium fits worse than a rather simple level-k or Laplacian-belief model combined with a standard error-response function.

Keywords:

coordination games; equilibrium selection; global game; Laplacian beliefs; private information; network effects;

JEL-Classification:

C72; C91; D81;

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Discussion Paper No. 360
January 4, 2023

Sufficient Statistics for Nonlinear Tax Systems with General Across-income Heterogeneity

Author:

Antoine Ferey (LMU Munich)
Benjamin Lockwood (Wharton)
Dmitry Taubinsky (UC Berkeley)

Abstract:

This paper provides general and empirically implementable sufficient statistics formulas for optimal nonlinear tax systems in the presence of across-income heterogeneity in preferences, inheritances, income-shifting capabilities, and other sources. We study unrestricted tax systems on income and savings (or other commodities) that implement the optimal direct-revelation mechanism, as well as simpler tax systems that impose common restrictions like separability between earnings and savings taxes. We characterize the optimum using familiar elasticity concepts and a sufficient statistic for general across-income heterogeneity: the difference between the cross-sectional variation of savings with income, and the causal effect of income on savings. The Atkinson-Stiglitz Theorem is a knife-edge case corresponding to zero difference, and a number of other key results in optimal tax theory are subsumed as special cases. We provide tractable extensions of these results that include multidimensional heterogeneity, additional efficiency rationales for taxing heterogeneous returns, and corrective motives to encourage more saving. Applying these formulas in a calibrated model of the U.S. economy, we find that the optimal savings tax is positive and progressive.

Keywords:

JEL-Classification:

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Discussion Paper No. 357

Voluntary Equity, Project Risk, and Capital Requirements

Author:

Andreas Haufler (LMU Munich)
Christoph Lülfesmann (Simon Fraser University)

Abstract:

We introduce a model of the banking sector that formally incorporates a buffer function of capital. Heterogeneous banks choose their portfolio risk, bank size, and capital holdings. Banks voluntarily hold equity when the buffer effect against the risk of default outweighs the cost advantages of debt financing. In this setting, banks with lower monitoring costs are larger, choose riskier portfolios, and have less equity. Moreover, binding capital requirements or levies on bank borrowing are shown to make higher-risk portfolios more attractive. Accounting for banks' interior capital choices can thus explain why higher capital ratios incentivize banks to undertake riskier projects.

Keywords:

voluntary equity; capital requirements; bank heterogeneity;

JEL-Classification:

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Discussion Paper No. 345
November 30, 2022

Redistribution and Unemployment Insurance

Author:

Antoine Ferey (LMU Munich)

Abstract:

This paper analyzes the interactions between redistribution and unemployment insurance policies and their implications for the optimal design of tax-benefit systems. In a setting where individuals with different earnings abilities are exposed to unemployment risk on the labor market, I characterize the optimal income tax schedule and the optimal unemployment benefit schedule in terms of empirically estimable sufficient statistics. I provide a Pareto-efficiency condition for tax-benefit systems that implies a tight link between optimal redistribution and optimal unemployment insurance: the steeper the profile of income taxes is, the flatter the profile of unemployment benefits should be, and vice versa. Optimal replacement rates are therefore monotonically decreasing with earnings, from 1 at the bottom of the earnings distribution to 0 at the top, and redistribution through unemployment benefits is efficient. Empirical applications show that these interactions between redistribution and unemployment insurance have important quantitative implications.

Keywords:

JEL-Classification:

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Discussion Paper No. 336

Attracting Profit Shifting or Fostering Innovation? On Patent Boxes and R&D Subsidies

Author:

Andreas Haufler (LMU Munich, CESifo)
Dirk Schindler (Erasmus University Rotterdam)

Abstract:

Many countries have introduced patent box regimes in recent years, offering a reduced tax rate to businesses for their IP-related income. In this paper, we analyze the effects of patent box regimes when countries can simultaneously use patent boxes and R&D subsidies to promote innovation. We show that when countries set their tax policies non-cooperatively, innovation is fostered, at the margin, only by the R&D subsidy, whereas the patent box tax rate is targeted at attracting international profit shifting. In equilibrium, patent box regimes emerge endogenously under policy competition, but never under policy coordination. We also compare the competition for mobile patents with the competition for mobile R&D units and show that enforcing a nexus principle is likely to reduce the aggressiveness of patent box regimes.

Keywords:

corporate taxation; profit shifting; patent boxes; R&D tax credits; tax competition;

JEL-Classification:

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Discussion Paper No. 335

Incentives, Globalization, and Redistribution

Author:

Antoine Ferey (LMU Munich, CESifo)
Andreas Haufler (LMU Munich, CESifo)
Carlo Perroni (University of Warwick, CESifo)

Abstract:

We offer a new explanation for why taxes have become less redistributive in many countries in parallel with an increase in income concentration. When performance-based contracts are needed to incentivize effort, redistribution through progressive income taxes becomes less precisely targeted. Taxation reduces after-tax income inequality but undermines performance-based contracts, lowering effort and raising pre-tax income differentials. Product market integration can widen the spread of project returns and make contract choices more responsive to changes in the level of taxation, resulting in a lower optimal income tax rate even when individuals are not inter-jurisdictionally mobile.

Keywords:

performance contracts; market integration; redistributive taxation;

JEL-Classification:

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Discussion Paper No. 323
April 13, 2022

Inattention and the Taxation Bias

Author:

Jeremy Boccanfuso (University of Bologna)
Antoine Ferey (LMU Munich)

Abstract:

This paper shows that agent inattention to taxes generates a time-inconsistency problem in the choice of tax policy. In equilibrium, inattention leads to inefficiently high tax rates and a taxation bias emerges. Combining structural and sufficient statistics approaches, we quantify the magnitude and the welfare effects of this policy distortion for US income tax rates, and find that the taxation bias is large, alters the progressivity of income taxes, and significantly reduces social welfare. Overall, our findings shed new light on the policy and welfare implications of inattention and misperceptions.

Keywords:

inattention; misperceptions; optimal taxation; policy distortions;

JEL-Classification:

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