Discussion Papers

Discussion Paper No. 357
January 4, 2023

Voluntary Equity, Project Risk, and Capital Requirements

Author:

Andreas Haufler (LMU Munich)
Christoph Lülfesmann (Simon Fraser University)

Abstract:

We introduce a model of the banking sector that formally incorporates a buffer function of capital. Heterogeneous banks choose their portfolio risk, bank size, and capital holdings. Banks voluntarily hold equity when the buffer effect against the risk of default outweighs the cost advantages of debt financing. In this setting, banks with lower monitoring costs are larger, choose riskier portfolios, and have less equity. Moreover, binding capital requirements or levies on bank borrowing are shown to make higher-risk portfolios more attractive. Accounting for banks' interior capital choices can thus explain why higher capital ratios incentivize banks to undertake riskier projects.

Keywords:

voluntary equity; capital requirements; bank heterogeneity;

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Discussion Paper No. 356

Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures

Author:

Gorkem Celik (ESSEC Business School, THEMA Research Center)
Dongsoo Shin (Santa Clara University)
Roland Strausz (HU Berlin)

Abstract:

We study information flows in an organization with a top management (principal) and multiple subunits (agents) with private information that determines the organization's aggregate efficiency. Under centralization, eliciting the agents' private information may induce the principal to manipulate aggregate information, which obstructs an effective use of information for the organization. Under delegation, the principal concedes more information rent, but is able to use the agents' information more effectively. The trade-off between the organizational structures depends on the likelihood that the agents are efficient. Centralizing information flows is optimal when such likelihood is low. Delegation, by contrast, is optimal when it is high.

Keywords:

agency; aggregate information; organization design;

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Discussion Paper No. 355

Betting on Diversity – Occupational Segregation and Gender Stereotypes

Author:

Urs Fischbacher (Universität Konstanz)
Dorothea Kübler (WZB Berlin, TU Berlin)
Robert Stüber (NYU Abu Dhabi)

Abstract:

Many occupations and industries are highly segregated with respect to gender. This segregation could be due to perceived job-specific productivity differences between men and women. It could also result from the belief that single-gender teams perform better. We investigate the two explanations in a lab experiment with students and in an online experiment with personnel managers. The subjects bet on the productivity of teams of different gender compositions in tasks that differ with respect to gender stereotypes. We obtain similar results in both samples. Women are picked more often for the stereotypically female task and men more often for the stereotypically male task. Subjects do not believe that homogeneous teams perform better but bet more on diverse teams, especially in the task with complementarities. Elicited expectations about the bets of others reveal that subjects expect the effect of the gender stereotypes of tasks but underestimate others’ bets on diversity.

Keywords:

gender segregation; hiring decisions; teams; discrimination; stereotypes;

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Discussion Paper No. 354

Behavioral Forces Driving Information Unraveling

Author:

Volker Benndorf (Goethe-Universität Frankfurt)
Dorothea Kübler (WZB Berlin, TU Berlin, CESifo)
Hans-Theo Normann (Universität Düsseldorf)

Abstract:

Information unraveling is an elegant theoretical argument suggesting that private information may be fully and voluntarily surrendered. The experimental literature has, however, failed to provide evidence of complete unraveling and has suggested senders' limited depth of reasoning as one behavioral explanation. In our novel design, decision-making is essentially sequential, which removes the requirements on subjects' reasoning and should enable subjects to play the standard Nash equilibrium with full revelation. However, our design also facilitates coordination on equilibria with partial unraveling which exist with other-regarding preferences. Our data confirm that the new design is successful in that it avoids miscoordination entirely. Roughly half of the groups fully unravel whereas other groups exhibit monotonic outcomes with partial unraveling. Altogether, we nd more information unraveling with the new design, but there is clear evidence that other-regarding preferences do play a role in impeding unraveling.

Keywords:

data protection; inequality aversion; information revelation; level-k reasoning;

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Discussion Paper No. 353

The Endowment Effect in the General Population

Author:

Dietmar Fehr (University of Heidelberg, CESifo)
Dorothea Kübler (WZB Berlin, TU Berlin, CESifo)

Abstract:

We study the endowment effect and expectation-based reference points in the field leveraging the setup of the Socio-Economic Panel. Households receive a small item for taking part in the panel, and we randomly assign respondents either a towel or a notebook, which they can exchange at the end of the interview. We observe a trading rate of 32 percent, consistent with an endowment effect, but no relationship with loss aversion. Manipulating expectations of the exchange opportunity, we find no support for expectation-based reference points. However, trading predicts residential mobility and is related to stock-market participation, i.e., economic decisions that entail parting with existing resources.

Keywords:

exchange asymmetry; reference-dependent preferences; loss aversion; field experiment; SOEP;

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Discussion Paper No. 352

The Indirect Fiscal Benefits of Low-Skilled Immigration

Author:

Mark Colas (University of Oregon)
Dominik Sachs (University of St. Gallen)

Abstract:

Low-skilled immigrants indirectly affect public finances through their effect on resident wages & labor supply. We operationalize this indirect fiscal effect in a model of immigration and the labor market. We derive closed-form expressions for this effect in terms of estimable statistics. An empirical quantification for the U.S. reveals an indirect fiscal benefit for one average low-skilled immigrant of roughly $750 annually. The indirect fiscal benefit may outweigh the negative direct fiscal effect that has previously been documented. This challenges the perception of low-skilled immigration as a fiscal burden.

Keywords:

immigration; fiscal impact; general equilibrium;

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Discussion Paper No. 351

The Spillover Effect of Services Offshoring on Local Labour Markets

Author:

Martina Magli (LMU Munich)

Abstract:

I provide new empirical evidence on the direct and indirect impact of services offshoring on local employment and wages, using a unique dataset on firms in the UK for the period 2000-2015. Exploiting variation in firms' services offshoring across labour markets, I show positive aggregate local labour employment and wage elasticity to services offshoring. Spillovers from offshoring to non-offshoring firms explain the positive results, and services offshoring complementary to firms' production has a larger effect than the offshoring competing with firms' outputs. Finally, I show that services offshoring widens firms' employment and wage dispersion within local labour markets.

Keywords:

services offshoring; local labour market; spillover effect; quantile analysis;

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Discussion Paper No. 350

Lying to Individuals versus Lying to Groups

Author:

Vera Angelova (TU Berlin)
Michel Tolksdorf (TU Berlin)

Abstract:

We investigate experimentally whether individuals or groups are more lied to, and how lying depends on the group size and the monetary loss inflicted by the lie. We employ an observed cheating game, where an individual's misreport of a privately observed number can monetarily benefit her while causing a loss to either a single individual, a group of two or a group of five. As the privately observed number is known to the experimenter, the game allows to study both, whether the report deviates from the observed number and also by how much. Treatments either vary the individual loss caused by a given lie (keeping the total loss constant), or the total loss (keeping the individual loss constant). We find more lies toward individuals than toward groups. Liars impose a larger loss with their lie when that loss is split among group members rather than borne individually. The size of the group does not affect lying behavior.

Keywords:

cheating; lying; groups; observed cheating game; laboratory experiment;

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Discussion Paper No. 95
December 3, 2022

Does Financial Literacy Improve Financial Inclusion? Cross Country Evidence

Author:

Antonia Grohmann (DIW Berlin)
Theres Klühs (Leibniz Universität Hannover)
Lukas Menkhoff (DIW Berlin, HU Berlin)

Abstract:

While financial inclusion is typically addressed by improving the financial infrastructure, we show that a higher degree of financial literacy also has a clear beneficial effect. We study this effect at the cross-country level, which allows us to consider institutional variation. Regarding "access to finance", financial infrastructure and financial literacy are mainly substitutes. However, regarding the "use of financial services", the effect of higher financial literacy strengthens the effect of more financial depth. The causal interpretation of these results is supported by IV-regressions. Moreover, the positive impact of financial literacy holds across income levels and several subgroups within countries.

Keywords:

financial inclusion; financial literacy; financial institutions; financial development;

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Discussion Paper No. 330
December 1, 2022

Ignorance, Intention and Stochastic Outcomes

Author:

Jana Friedrichsen (FU Berlin, HU Berlin, DIW, WZB)
Katharina Momsen (University of Innsbruck)
Stefano Piasenti (HU Berlin, DIW)

Abstract:

In sequential interactions, both the agent’s intention and the outcome of his choice may influence the principal’s action. While outcomes are typically observable, intentions are more likely to be hidden, leaving potential wiggle room for the principal when deciding on a reciprocating action. We employ a controlled experiment to investigate how intentions and outcome affect the principal’s actions and whether principals use hidden information as an excuse to behave more selfishly. We find that principals react mainly to the intention of the agent. When intentions are not revealed by default, principals tend to select into information based on their inclination to behave more prosocially. While information avoidance is frequent and selfishness is higher with hidden information, we do not find evidence of a strategic exploitation of moral wiggle room.

Keywords:

information avoidance; dictator game; moral wiggle room; intentions; reciprocity;

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