The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks – Evidence From a Field Experiment

Authors:

Englmaier, Florian (LMU Munich)
Grimm, Stefan (LMU Munich)
Schindler, David (Tilburg University)
Schudy, Simeon (LMU Munich)

Abstract:

Despite the prevalence of non-routine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is known about how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a field experiment with more than 3000 participants, we document a positive effect of bonus incentives on the probability of completion of such a task. Bonus incentives increase performance due to the reward rather than the reference point (performance threshold) they provide. The framing of bonuses (as gains or losses) plays a minor role. Incentives improve performance also in an additional sample of presumably less motivated workers. However, incentives reduce these workers’ willingness to “explore” original solutions.

Keywords:

team work; bonus; incentives; loss; gain; non-routine; exploration

JEL-Classification:

C92; C93; J33; D03; M52

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The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks – Evidence From a Field Experiment
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