Discussion Paper No. 87
November 4, 2021
The Influence of Overconfidence and Competition Neglect on Entry into Competition
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Abstract:
I investigate whether two mechanisms leading to biased beliefs about success, overconfidence and competition neglect, influence decisions to enter competitive environments. I use a controlled laboratory setting that allows to elicit belief distributions related to absolute as well as relative overconfidence to study it comprehensively and introduce two treatment variations: First, some participants receive detailed performance feedback addressing absolute and relative overconfidence before making their decision. Second, I vary whether the competition group consists of all potential competitors or only of individuals who also chose to compete. I find that there is systematic heterogeneity in perception biases. In addition, both mechanisms influence individuals' decisions. However, choices are closely tied to previous performance and assessments, and there are no significant gender differences.
Keywords:
competition neglect; competitive behavior; feedback; overconfidence;
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Discussion Paper No. 62
Size Matters - 'Over'investments in a Relational Contracting Setting
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Abstract:
The corporate finance literature documents that managers tend to over-invest in their companies. A number of theoretical contributions have aimed at explaining this stylized fact, most of them focusing on a fundamental agency problem between shareholders and managers. The present paper shows that over-investments are not necessarily the (negative) consequence of agency problems between shareholders and managers, but instead might be a second-best optimal response to address problems of limited commitment and limited liquidity. If a firm has to rely on relational contracts to motivate its workforce, and if it faces a volatile environment, investments into general, non-relationship-specific, capital can increase the efficiency of a firm's labor relations.
Keywords:
relational contracts; corporate finance; capital investments;
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Discussion Paper No. 42
November 3, 2021
Teamwork as a Self-Disciplining Device
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Abstract:
We show that team formation can serve as an implicit commitment device to overcome problems of self-control. If individuals have present-biased pref- erences, effort that is costly today but rewarded at some later point in time is too low from the perspective of an individual’s long-run self. If agents in- teract repeatedly and can monitor each other, a relational contract involving teamwork can help to improve performance. The mutual promise to work harder is credible because the team breaks up after an agent has not kept this promise – which leads to individual underproduction in the future and hence a reduction of future utility.
Keywords:
self-control problems; teamwork; relational contracts;
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Discussion Paper No. 41
The Commitment Role of Equity Financing
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Abstract:
Existing theories of a firm’s optimal capital structure seem to fail in explaining why many healthy and profitable firms rely heavily on equity financing, even though benefits associated with debt (like tax shields) appear to be high and the bankruptcy risk low. This holds in particular for firms that show a strong commitment towards their workforce and are popular among employees. We demonstrate that such financing behavior may be driven by implicit arrangements made between a firm and its managers/employees. Equity financing generally strengthens a firm’s credibility to honor implicit promises. Debt, however, has an adverse effect on the enforceability of these arrangements because too much debt increases the firm’s reneging temptation, as some of the negative consequences of breaking implicit promises can be shifted to creditors. Our analysis provides an explanation for why some firms only use little debt financing. Predictions made by our theory are in line with a number of empirical results, which seem to stay in contrast to existing theories on capital structure.
Keywords:
relational contracts; capital structure; corporate finance; debt financing;
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Discussion Paper No. 6
November 2, 2021
Long-Term Employment Relations when Agents Are Present Biased
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Abstract:
We analyze how agents’ present bias affects optimal contracting in an infinite- horizon employment setting. The principal maximizes profits by offering a menu of contracts to naive agents: a virtual contract – which agents plan to choose in the future – and a real contract which they end up choosing. This virtual contract motivates the agent and allows the principal to keep the agent below his outside option. Moreover, under limited liability, implemented effort can be inefficiently high. With a finite time horizon, the degree of exploitation of agents decreases over the life-cycle. While the baseline model abstracts from moral hazard, we show that the result persists also when allowing for non-contractible effort.
Keywords:
employment relations; dynamic contracting; present bias;
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