Report-Dependent Utility and Strategy-Proofness


Meisner, Vincent (TU Berlin)


Despite the truthful dominant strategy, participants in strategy-proof me- chanisms submit manipulated preferences. In our model, participants dislike rejections and enjoy the confirmation from getting what they declared most desirable. Formally, the payo↵ from a match decreases in its position in the submitted ranking such that a strategic trade-o↵ between preference inten- sity and match probability arises. This trade-o↵ can trigger the commonly observed self-selection strategies. We show that misrepresentations can per- sist for arbitrarily small report-dependent components. However, honesty is guaranteed to be optimal if and only if there is no conflict between the quality and feasibility of a match.


market design; matching; school choice; self-regarding preferences; strategy-proof mechanisms


D47; D78; D81; D91


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Report-Dependent Utility and Strategy-Proofness
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