sequential inefficiencies

Relational Contracts with Private Information On the Future Value of the Relationship
The Upside of Implicit Downsizing Costs

benjamin Juli 23, 2018 Project B05

106

CRC TRR 190

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Prof. Dr. Klaus M. Schmidt (LMU Munich)

Deputy spokesperson:
Prof. Georg Weizsäcker, Ph.D. (HU Berlin)

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Collaborative Research Center TRR 190
Rationality and Competition

Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
80539 Munich, Germany

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Mail: office@rationality-and-competition.de
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CRC Rationality and Competition

2017-2028 | CRC TRR 190 | Rationality and Competition | Legal

sequential inefficiencies

Relational Contracts with Private Information On the Future Value of the RelationshipThe Upside of Implicit Downsizing Costs

Relational Contracts with Private Information On the Future Value of the Relationship
The Upside of Implicit Downsizing Costs