B01
Competition and Incentives
Discussion Papers

Discussion Paper No. 305
December 1, 2021

Cursed Consumers and the Effectiveness of Consumer Protection Policies

Author:

Peter Schwardmann (LMU Munich)
Alessandro Ispano (CY Cergy Paris Université, CNRS, THEMA)

Abstract:

We model firms’ quality disclosure and pricing in the presence of cursed consumers, who fail to be sufficiently skeptical about undisclosed quality. We show that cursed consumers are exploited in duopoly markets if firms are vertically differentiated, if there are few cursed consumers, and if average product quality is high. Three common consumer protection policies that work under monopoly, i.e. mandatory disclosure, third party disclosure and consumer education, may all increase exploitation and decrease welfare. Even where these policies improve overall welfare, they often lead to a reduction in consumer surplus. We show that our conclusions hold in extensions with endogenous quality choice and horizontal differentiation.

Keywords:

naive; cursed; disclosure; consumer protection; labeling; competition;

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Discussion Paper No. 304

Spin Doctors: An Experiment on Vague Disclosure

Author:

Peter Schwardmann (LMU Munich)
Alessandro Ispano (CY Cergy Paris Université, CNRS, THEMA)
Marvin Deversi (LMU Munich)

Abstract:

Unfavorable news are often delivered under the disguise of vagueness. Our theory-driven laboratory experiment investigates this strategic use of vagueness in voluntary disclosure and asks whether there is scope for policy to improve information transmission. We find that vagueness is profitably deployed by senders to fool those receivers that lack strategic sophistication. Imposing precise disclosure leads to more easily interpretable messages, but results in fewer sender types disclosing at all. Since non- disclosure also systematically misleads naive receivers, the welfare implications of imposing precision are not obvious. However, our model and experiment show that information transmission and the welfare of naive receivers are improved by policies that impose precision. Our results speak to the rules governing firms’ disclosure of quality-relevant information, the disclosure of research findings, and testimonies in a court of law.

Keywords:

communication; naïveté; flexibility; regulation;

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Discussion Paper No. 288
November 10, 2021

Decomposing the Disposition Effect

Author:

Johannes K. Maier (LMU Munich, CESifo)
Dominik S. Fischer (CRA)

Abstract:

We theoretically show that there is a fundamental disconnect be- tween the disposition effect, i.e., investors’ tendency to sell winning assets too early and losing assets too late, and its common empirical measure, namely a positive difference between the proportion of gains and losses re- alized. While its common measure cannot identify the disposition effect, it identifies the presence of some systematic bias. We further investigate the measure’s comparative statics regarding markets, investors’ informa- tion level, and their attention. Besides generating novel testable predictions, this analysis reveals that, in contrast to the measure’s sign, variations in its magnitude are informative for its cause.

Keywords:

disposition effect; rational benchmark; investor behavior; behavioral biases; market segments; financial attention; information level;

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Discussion Paper No. 275

Meta-Analysis of Empirical Estimates of Loss-Aversion

Author:

Taisuke Imai (LMU Munich)
Alexander Brown (Texas A&M University)
Ferdinand M. Vieider (Ghent University)
Colin F. Camerer (California Institute of Technology)

Abstract:

Loss aversion is one of the most widely used concepts in behavioral economics. We conduct a large-scale interdisciplinary meta-analysis, to systematically accumulate knowledge from numerous empirical estimates of the loss aversion coefficient reported during the past couple of decades. We examine 607 empirical estimates of loss aversion from 150 articles in economics, psychology, neuroscience, and several other disciplines. Our analysis indicates that the mean loss aversion coefficient is between 1.8 and 2.1. We also document how reported estimates vary depending on the observable characteristics of the study design.

Keywords:

loss aversion; prospect theory; meta-analysis;

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Discussion Paper No. 272

Prices versus Quantities with Morally Concerned Consumers

Author:

Klaus M. Schmidt (LMU Munich)
Fabian Herweg (University of Bayreuth)

Abstract:

It is widely believed that an environmental tax (price regulation) and cap-and-trade (quantity regulation) are equally efficient in controlling pollution when there is no uncertainty. We show that this is not the case if some consumers (firms, local governments) are morally concerned about pollution and the pollution price is inefficiently low for political reasons. Emissions are lower and material welfare is higher with price regulation. Furthermore, quantity regulation gives rise to dysfunctional incentive and distribution effects. It shifts the burden of adjustment to the poor and discourages voluntary efforts to reduce pollution, while price regulation makes these efforts effective.

Keywords:

emissions trading; carbon tax; climate change; prices versus quantities; behavioral industrial organization;

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Discussion Paper No. 270

Das Design von Klimaschutzverhandlungen

Author:

Klaus M. Schmidt (LMU Munich)

Abstract:

In seiner Thünen-Vorlesung vor dem Verein für Socialpolitik im Herbst 2020 hat Klaus Schmidt das Design von Klimaschutzverhandlungen untersucht. Er geht dabei von einem Vorschlag Martin Weitzmans aus, künftige Verhandlungen auf einen einheitlichen CO2-Mindestpreis zu fokussieren. Wäre ein solches Vorgehen demjenigen, wie es in den Abkommen von Paris und Kyoto praktiziert wurde, tatsächlich überlegen? Schmidt berichtet von zwei experimentellen Studien, in denen er gemeinsam mit Koautoren Licht auf diese Frage geworfen hat. Die Ergebnisse beider Studien unterstützen den Vorschlag von Weitzman.

Keywords:

Klimaschutzverhandlungen; Verhandlungsdesign; Reziprozität; CO2-Preis;

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Discussion Paper No. 267

Focusing Climate Negotiations on a Uniform Common Commitment Can Promote Cooperation

Author:

Klaus M. Schmidt (LMU Munich)
Axel Ockenfels (University of Cologne)

Abstract:

International cooperation on the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, disarmament, or free trade needs to be negotiated. The success of such negotiations depends on how they are designed. In the context of international climate change policy, it has been proposed [e.g., Weitzman J of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists (2014)] that shifting the negotiation focus to a uniform common commitment (such as a uniform minimum carbon price) would lead to more ambitious cooperation. Yet, a proof-of-concept for this important claim is lacking. Based on game theoretical analyses, we present experimental evidence that strongly supports this conjecture. In our study, human subjects negotiate contributions to a public good. Subjects differ in their benefits and costs of cooperation. Participation in the negotiations and all commitments are voluntary. We consider treatments in which agreements are enforceable, and treatments in which they have to be self-enforcing. In both situations, negotiating a uniform common commitment is more successful in promoting cooperation than negotiating individual commitments (as in the Paris agreement) and complex common commitments that tailor the commitment to the specific situation of each party (as attempted with the Kyoto protocol). Furthermore, as suggested by our model, a uniform common commitment benefits most from being enforced.

Keywords:

cooperation; negotiation design; common commitment; reciprocity; climate policy;

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Discussion Paper No. 266

A Model United Nations Experiment on Climate Negotiations

Author:

Klaus M. Schmidt (LMU Munich)
Elisa Hofmann (University of Jena)
Lucas Kyriacou (University of Bern)

Abstract:

Weitzman (2014) proposed that focusing international climate negotiations on a uniform carbon price is more effective than Paris style negotiations in achieving ambitious climate action. We put this hypothesis to an experimental test by simulating international negotiations on climate change in collaboration with Model United Nations associations. This novel experimental format combines some of the advantages of lab and field experiments. Our results show that negotiating a common commitment on a uniform carbon price yields significantly higher emissions reductions, more participation, and more equal contributions than individual commitments to a non-binding common goal à la Paris.

Keywords:

climate negotiations; negotiation design; model united nations; uniform carbon price;

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Discussion Paper No. 238
November 9, 2021

Selling Dreams: Endogenous Optimism in Lending Markets

Author:

Peter Schwardmann (LMU Munich)
Luc Bridet (University of St Andrews)

Abstract:

We propose a simple model of borrower optimism in competitive lending markets with asymmetric information. Borrowers in our model engage in self-deception to arrive at a belief that optimally trades off the anticipatory utility benefits and material costs of optimism. Lenders’ contract design shapes these benefits and costs. The model yields three key results. First, the borrower’s motivated cognition increases her material welfare, regardless of whether or not she ends up being optimistic in equilibrium. Our model thus helps explain why wishful thinking is not driven out of markets. Second, in line with empirical evidence, a low cost of lending and a booming economy lead to optimism and the widespread collateralization of loans. Third, equilibrium collateral requirements may be inefficiently high.

Keywords:

optimal expectations; motivated cognition; wishful thinking; financial crisis; lending markets; screening;

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Discussion Paper No. 209

Delegation, Promotion, and Manager Selection

Author:

Benjamin Häusinger (LMU Munich)

Abstract:

Promotions serve two purposes. They ought to provide incentives for employees and to select the best employee for a management position. However, if non-contractible managerial decision rights give rise to private benefits and preference misalignment between managers and the firm, these two purposes are in conflict. This is because the worker with the largest private benefit as a manager has the strongest incentives to work hard to get promoted. This article shows how the interplay of managerial decision rights and performance-based promotions leads to a situation often referred to as the Peter principle: employees that create lower expected profits as managers have yet better promotion prospects. That finding still holds when the firm owner optimally chooses the promotion rule, the degree of delegation, and wage payments to both employees and managers. To optimize organizational design, the firm balances better worker incentivization but worse manager selection by using performance-based promotions and restricting managerial decision rights.

Keywords:

peter principle; promotion; delegation of decision rights; incentives; manager selection; organizational design;

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