A06
Educational Choices, Market Design, and Student Outcomes
Discussion Papers

Discussion Paper No. 91
November 4, 2021

Does Ignorance of Economic Returns and Costs Explain the Educational Aspiration Gap? Evidence from Representative Survey Experiments

Author:

Philipp Lergetporer (ifo Munich)
Katharina Werner (ifo Munich)
Ludger Woessmann (ifo, LMU Munich)

Abstract:

The gap in university enrollment by parental education is large and persistent in many countries. In our representative survey, 74 percent of German university graduates, but only 36 percent of those without a university degree favor a university education for their children. The latter are more likely to underestimate returns and overestimate costs of university. Experimental provision of return and cost information significantly increases educational aspirations. However, it does not close the aspiration gap as university graduates respond even more strongly to the information treatment. Persistent effects in a follow-up survey indicate that participants indeed process and remember the information. Differences in economic preference parameters also cannot account for the educational aspiration gap. Our results cast doubt that ignorance of economic returns and costs explains educational inequality in Germany.

Keywords:

inequality; higher education; university; aspiration; information; returns to education; survey experiment;

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Discussion Paper No. 63

Skills, Signals, and Employability: An Experimental Investigation

Author:

Marc Piopiunik (ifo Institute)
Guido Schwerdt (University of Konstanz)
Lisa Simon (ifo Institute)
Ludger Woessmann (ifo, LMU Munich)

Abstract:

As skills of labor-market entrants are usually not directly observed by employers, individuals acquire skill signals. To study which signals are valued by employers, we simultaneously and independently randomize a broad range of skill signals on pairs of resumes of fictitious applicants among which we ask a large representative sample of German human-resource managers to choose. We find that signals in all three studied domains - cognitive skills, social skills, and maturity - have a significant effect on being invited for a job interview. Consistent with the relevance, expectedness, and credibility of different signals, the specific signal that is effective in each domain differs between apprenticeship applicants and college graduates. While GPAs and social skills are significant for both genders, males are particularly rewarded for maturity and females for IT and language skills. Older HR managers value school grades less and other signals more, whereas HR managers in larger firms value college grades more.

Keywords:

signals; cognitive skills; social skills; resume; hiring; labor market;

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Discussion Paper No. 18
November 3, 2021

Relative Consumption Preferences and Public Provision of Private Goods

Author:

Tobias König (HU Berlin, WZB)
Tobias Lausen (University of Hannover)

Abstract:

This paper shows that the public provision of private goods may be justified on pure efficiency grounds in an environment where individuals have relative con- sumption concerns. By providing private goods, governments directly intervene in the consumption structure, and thereby have an instrument to correct for the ex- cessive consumption of positional goods. We identify sufficient conditions when the public provision of private goods is always Pareto-improving, even when (linear) consumption taxes are available. In fact, with the public provision of private goods, there are cases where first-best allocations can be achieved, and a luxury tax on the positional good is redundant.

Keywords:

public provision; social preferences; status-seeking;

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Discussion Paper No. 9

Image Concerns and the Political Economy of Publicly Provided Private Goods

Author:

Tobias König (WZB, HU Berlin)
Tobias Lausen (University of Hannover)
Andreas Wagener (University of Hannover)

Abstract:

Governments often provide their citizens with goods and services that are also supplied in markets: education, housing, nutritional assistance, etc. We analyze the political economy of the public provision of private goods when individuals care about their social image. We show that image concerns motivate richer individuals to vote for the public provision of goods they themselves buy in markets, the reason being that a higher provision level attracts more individuals to the public system, enhancing the social exclusivity of market purchases. In effect, majority voting may lead to a public provision that only a minority of citizens use. Users in the public system may enjoy better provision than users in the private system. We characterize the coalitions that can prevail in a political equilibrium.

Keywords:

in-kind provision; status preferences; majority voting;

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Discussion Paper No. 5
November 2, 2021

Self-Confidence and Unraveling in Matching Markets

Author:

Marie-Pierre Dargnies (University of Paris Dauphine)
Rustamdjan Hakimov (WZB)
Dorothea Kübler (TU Berlin, WZB)

Abstract:

We document experimentally how biased self-assessments affect the outcome of matching markets. In the experiments, we exogenously manipulate the self-confidence of participants regarding their relative performance by employing hard and easy real-effort tasks. We give participants the option to accept early offers when information about their performance has not been revealed, or to wait for the assortative matching based on their actual relative performance. Early offers are accepted more often when the task is hard than when it is easy. We show that the treatment effect works through a shift in beliefs, i.e., underconfident agents are more likely to accept early offers than overconfident agents. The experiment identifies a behavioral determinant of unraveling, namely biased self-assessments, which can lead to penalties for underconfident individuals as well as efficiency losses.

Keywords:

market unraveling; experiment; self-confidence; matching markets;

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Discussion Paper No. 203
October 22, 2021

Belief Updating: Does the 'Good-News, Bad-News' Asymmetry Extend to Purely Financial Domains?

Author:

Kai Barron (WZB Berlin)

Abstract:

Bayes' statistical rule remains the status quo for modeling belief updating in both normative and descriptive models of behavior under uncertainty. Some recent research has questioned the use of Bayes' rule in descriptive models of behavior, presenting evidence that people overweight 'good news' relative to 'bad news' when updating ego-relevant beliefs. In this paper, we present experimental evidence testing whether this 'good-news, bad-news' effect is present in a financial decision making context (i.e. a domain that is important for understanding much economic decision making). We find no evidence of asymmetric updating in this domain. In contrast, in our experiment, belief updating is close to the Bayesian benchmark on average. However, we show that this average behavior masks substantial heterogeneity in individual updating. We find no evidence in support of a sizeable subgroup of asymmetric updators.

Keywords:

economic experiments; bayes' rule; belief updating; belief measurement; proper scoring rule; motivated beliefs;

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