Discussion Paper No. 387
February 27, 2023
Transparency and Policy Competition: Experimental Evidence from German Citizens and Politicians
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Abstract:
A lack of transparency about policy performance can pose a major obstacle to welfare-enhancing policy competition across jurisdictions. In parallel surveys with German citizens and state parliamentarians, we document that both groups misperceive the performance of their state’s education system. Experimentally providing performance information polarizes citizens’ political satisfaction between high- and low-performing states and increases their demand for greater transparency of states’ educational performance. Parliamentarians’ support for the transparency policy is opportunistic: Performance information increases (decreases) policy support in high-performing (low-performing) states. We conclude that increasing the public salience of educational performance information may incentivize politicians to implement welfare-enhancing reforms.
Keywords:
yardstick competition; beliefs; information; citizens; politicians; survey experiment;
JEL-Classification:
H11; I28; D83;
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Discussion Paper No. 383
February 14, 2023
The ifo Education Survey 2014-2021
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The ifo Education Survey is a representative opinion survey of the German voting-age population on education topics that has been conducted annually since 2014. It covers public preferences on a wide range of education policy issues ranging from early childhood education, schools, and apprenticeships to university education and life-long learning. The dataset comprises several survey experiments that facilitate investigating the causal effects of information provision, framing, and question design on answering behavior. This paper gives an overview of the survey content and methodology, describes the data, and explains how researchers can access the dataset of over 4000 participants per wave.
Keywords:
education; policy; survey; experiment; public opinion; political economy; Germany;
JEL-Classification:
I28; D72; H52;
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Discussion Paper No. 377
January 30, 2023
Confidence and College Applications: Evidence from a Randomized Intervention
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This paper investigates the role self-confidence plays in college applications. Using incentivized experiments, we measure the self-confidence of more than 2,000 students applying to colleges in France. This data reveals that the best female and low-SES students significantly underestimate their rank in the grade distribution compared to male and high-SES students. By matching our survey data with administrative data on real college applications and admissions, we show that miscalibrated confidence affects college choice on top of grades. We then estimate the impact of a randomized intervention that corrects students' under- and overconfidence by informing them of their real rank in the grade distribution. The treatment reduces the impact of under- and overconfidence for college applications, to the point where only grades but not miscalibrated confidence predict the application behavior of treated students. Providing feedback also makes the best students, who were initially underconfident, apply to more ambitious programs with stronger effects for female and low-SES students.
Keywords:
matching mechanism; confidence; information treatment; survey experiment;
JEL-Classification:
I24; J24; D91; C90;
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Discussion Paper No. 376
Improving Transparency and Verifiability in School Admissions: Theory and Experiment
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Students participating in centralized admissions procedures do not typically have access to the information used to determine their matched school, such as other students' preferences or school priorities. This can lead to doubts about whether their matched schools were computed correctly (the 'Verifiability Problem') or, at a deeper level, whether the promised admissions procedure was even used (the 'Transparency Problem'). In a general centralized admissions model that spans many popular applications, we show how these problems can be addressed by providing appropriate feedback to students, even without disclosing sensitive private information like other students' preferences or school priorities. In particular, we show that the Verifiability Problem can be solved by (1) publicly communicating the minimum scores required to be matched to a school ('cutoffs'); or (2) using `predictable' preference elicitation procedures that convey rich 'experiential' information. In our main result, we show that the Transparency Problem can be solved by using cutoffs and predictable procedures together. We find strong support for these solutions in a laboratory experiment, and show how they can be simply implemented for popular school admissions applications involving top trading cycles, and deferred and immediate acceptance.
Keywords:
school choice; matching; transparency; cutoffs; dynamic mechanisms; experiment;
JEL-Classification:
C78; C73; D78; D82;
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Discussion Paper No. 373
January 23, 2023
Global Universal Basic Skills: Current Deficits and Implications for World Development
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How far is the world away from ensuring that every child obtains the basic skills needed to be internationally competitive? And what would accomplishing this mean for world development? Based on the micro data of international and regional achievement tests, we map achievement onto a common (PISA) scale. We then estimate the share of children not achieving basic skills for 159 countries that cover 98.1% of world population and 99.4% of world GDP. We find that at least two-thirds of the world's youth do not reach basic skill levels, ranging from 24% in North America to 89% in South Asia and 94% in Sub-Saharan Africa. Our economic analysis suggests that the present value of lost world economic output due to missing the goal of global universal basic skills amounts to over $700 trillion over the remaining century, or 11% of discounted GDP.
Keywords:
skills; student achievement; development goals; economic growth;
JEL-Classification:
I25; O15; O47;
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Discussion Paper No. 355
January 4, 2023
Betting on Diversity – Occupational Segregation and Gender Stereotypes
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Many occupations and industries are highly segregated with respect to gender. This segregation could be due to perceived job-specific productivity differences between men and women. It could also result from the belief that single-gender teams perform better. We investigate the two explanations in a lab experiment with students and in an online experiment with personnel managers. The subjects bet on the productivity of teams of different gender compositions in tasks that differ with respect to gender stereotypes. We obtain similar results in both samples. Women are picked more often for the stereotypically female task and men more often for the stereotypically male task. Subjects do not believe that homogeneous teams perform better but bet more on diverse teams, especially in the task with complementarities. Elicited expectations about the bets of others reveal that subjects expect the effect of the gender stereotypes of tasks but underestimate others’ bets on diversity.
Keywords:
gender segregation; hiring decisions; teams; discrimination; stereotypes;
JEL-Classification:
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Discussion Paper No. 354
Behavioral Forces Driving Information Unraveling
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Information unraveling is an elegant theoretical argument suggesting that private information may be fully and voluntarily surrendered. The experimental literature has, however, failed to provide evidence of complete unraveling and has suggested senders' limited depth of reasoning as one behavioral explanation. In our novel design, decision-making is essentially sequential, which removes the requirements on subjects' reasoning and should enable subjects to play the standard Nash equilibrium with full revelation. However, our design also facilitates coordination on equilibria with partial unraveling which exist with other-regarding preferences. Our data confirm that the new design is successful in that it avoids miscoordination entirely. Roughly half of the groups fully unravel whereas other groups exhibit monotonic outcomes with partial unraveling. Altogether, we nd more information unraveling with the new design, but there is clear evidence that other-regarding preferences do play a role in impeding unraveling.
Keywords:
data protection; inequality aversion; information revelation; level-k reasoning;
JEL-Classification:
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Discussion Paper No. 353
The Endowment Effect in the General Population
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We study the endowment effect and expectation-based reference points in the field leveraging the setup of the Socio-Economic Panel. Households receive a small item for taking part in the panel, and we randomly assign respondents either a towel or a notebook, which they can exchange at the end of the interview. We observe a trading rate of 32 percent, consistent with an endowment effect, but no relationship with loss aversion. Manipulating expectations of the exchange opportunity, we find no support for expectation-based reference points. However, trading predicts residential mobility and is related to stock-market participation, i.e., economic decisions that entail parting with existing resources.
Keywords:
exchange asymmetry; reference-dependent preferences; loss aversion; field experiment; SOEP;
JEL-Classification:
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Discussion Paper No. 349
November 30, 2022
Keep Calm and Carry On: The Short- vs. Long-Run Effects of Mindfulness Meditation on (Academic) Performance
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Mindfulness-based meditation practices are becoming increasingly popular in Western societies, including in the business world and in education. While the scientific literature has largely documented the benefits of mindfulness meditation for mental health, little is still known about potential spillovers of these practices on other important life outcomes, such as performance. We address this question through a field experiment in an educational setting. We study the causal impact of mindfulness meditation on academic performance through a randomized evaluation of a well-known 8-week mindfulness meditation training delivered to university students on campus. As expected, the intervention improves students' mental health and non-cognitive skills. However, it takes time before students' performance can benefit from mindfulness meditation: we find that, if anything, the intervention marginally decreases average grades in the short run, i.e., during the exam period right after the end of the intervention, whereas it significantly increases academic performance, by about 0.4 standard deviations, in the long run (ca. 6 months after the end of intervention). We investigate the underlying mechanisms and discuss the implications of our results.
Keywords:
performance; mental health; education; meditation; field experiment;
JEL-Classification:
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Discussion Paper No. 334
Aversion to Hiring Algorithms: Transparency, Gender Profiling, and Self-Confidence
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We run an online experiment to study the origins of algorithm aversion. Participants are either in the role of workers or of managers. Workers perform three real-effort tasks: task 1, task 2, and the job task which is a combination of tasks 1 and 2. They choose whether the hiring decision between themselves and another worker is made either by a participant in the role of a manager or by an algorithm. In a second set of experiments, managers choose whether they want to delegate their hiring decisions to the algorithm. In the baseline treatments, we observe that workers choose the manager more often than the algorithm, and managers also prefer to make the hiring decisions themselves rather than delegate them to the algorithm. When the algorithm does not use workers' gender to predict their job task performance and workers know this, they choose the algorithm more often. Providing details on how the algorithm works does not increase the preference for the algorithm, neither for workers nor for managers. Providing feedback to managers about their performance in hiring the best workers increases their preference for the algorithm, as managers are, on average, overconfident.
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