Discussion Paper No. 53
November 4, 2021
Consumer-Optimal Information Design
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In many trade environments - such as online markets - buyers fully learn their valuation for goods only after contracting. I characterize the buyer-optimal ex-ante information in such environments. Employing a classical sequential screening framework, I find that buyers prefer to remain partially uninformed, since such an information structure induces the seller to set low prices. For the optimal information signal, trade is efficient, and the seller only extracts the static monopoly profit. Further, I fully characterize all possible surplus divisions that can arise in sequential screening for a given prior.
Keywords:
information disclosure; sequential screening; strategic learning; bayesian persuasion; mechanism design;
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Discussion Paper No. 52
Coal and Blood: Industrialization and the Rise of Nationalism in Prussia before 1914
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Industrialization and the rise of nationalism were the two major developments in Germany before the World War I. A novel county-level dataset reveals that industrialization and nationalism measured by membership in the "Kriegervereine'", the biggest civil organization at the time, were negatively correlated. Using coal potential as an IV for identification, I find strong evidence for a causal impact of industrialization on nationalism. In order to detect possible mechanisms, a three stage IV regression model produces strong support that migration and trade union membership were crucial factors that linked industrialization and nationalism.
Keywords:
nationalism; industrialization; Prussia;
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Discussion Paper No. 51
Behavioral Biases in Marketing
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Psychology and economics (the mixture of which is known as behavioral economics) are two fundamental disciplines underlying marketing. Various marketing studies document the non-rational behavior of consumers, even though behavioral biases might not always be consistently termed or formally described. In this review, we identify empirical research that studies behavioral biases in marketing. We summarize the key findings according to three classes of deviations (i.e., non-standard preferences, non-standard beliefs, and non-standard decision-making) and the marketing mix instruments (i.e., product, price, place, and promotion). We thereby introduce marketing researchers to the theoretical foundation of and terminology used in behavioral economics. For scholars from behavioral economics, we provide ready access to the rich empirical, applied marketing literature. We conclude with important managerial implications resulting from the behavioral biases of consumers, and we present avenues for future research.
Keywords:
marketing; behavioral economics; behavioral biases; review;
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Discussion Paper No. 50
November 3, 2021
Why Should Majority Voting Be Unfair?
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The common use of majority rule in group decision making is puzzling. In theory, it inequitably favors the proposer, and paradoxically, it disadvantages voters further if they are inequity averse. In practice, however, outcomes are equitable. The present paper analyzes data from a novel experimental design to identify the underlying social preferences. Our experiment compares one-shot and indefinite horizon versions of random-proposer majority bargaining (the Baron-Ferejohn game) which allow us to disentangle behaviors compatible with altruism, inequity aversion, and reference dependent altruism. Most subjects are classified as reference-dependent altruists, around 10% are inequity averse. Subjects are egoistic when their payoff is below their reference point, they become efficiency concerned when satisfied, and the reference point is either the ex ante expectation or the opponent's payoff. Finally, we successfully test RDA out-of-sample on a number of distribution and bargaining games from three seminal social preference experiments.
Keywords:
bargaining; voting; experiment; social preferences; quantal response equilibrium;
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Discussion Paper No. 49
The Timing of Choice-Enhancing Policies
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Recent studies investigate policies motivating consumers to make an active choice as a way to protect unsophisticated consumers. We analyze the optimal timing of such choice-enhancing policies when a firm can strategically react to them. In our model, a firm provides a contract with automatic renewal. We show that a policy intending to enhance consumers’ choices when they choose a contract can be detrimental to welfare. By contrast, a choice-enhancing policy at the time of contract renewal increases welfare more robustly. Our results highlight that policies should be targeted in timing to the actual choice inefficiency.
Keywords:
active choice; automatic renewal; automatic enrollment; procrastination; consumer naivete; present bias;
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Discussion Paper No. 48
English versus Vickrey Auctions with Loss Averse Bidders
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Evidence suggests that people evaluate outcomes relative to expectations. I analyze this expectation-based loss aversion [Ko ̋szegi and Rabin (2006, 2009)] in the context of dynamic and static auctions, where the reference point is given by the (endogenous) equilibrium outcome. If agents update their reference point during the auction, the arrival of information crucially affects equilibrium behavior. Consequently, I show that—even with independent private values—the Vickrey auction yields strictly higher revenue than the En- glish auction, violating the well known revenue equivalence. Thus, dynamic loss aversion offers a novel explanation for empirically observed differences between these auction formats.
Keywords:
vickrey auction; english auction; expectation-based loss aversion; revenue equivalence; dynamic loss aversion; personal equilibrium;
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Discussion Paper No. 10
Pay What You Want as a Pricing Model for Open Access Publishing?
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We analyze “Pay What You Want” as a business model for Open Access publishing by discussing motives leading authors to make voluntary contributions, potential benefits for publishers and present results from a field experiment at one publisher. Data from the field experiment indicate authors’ willingness to voluntarily contribute.
Keywords:
gold open access; article processing charges; costumer-driven pricing; voluntary contributions; field experiment;
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Discussion Paper No. 47
Procurement with Unforeseen Contingencies
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The procurement of complex projects is often plagued by large cost overruns. One important reason for these additional costs are flaws in the initial design. If the project is procured with a price-only auction, sellers who spotted some of the flaws have no incentive to reveal them early. Each seller prefers to conceal his information until he is awarded the contract and then renegotiate when he is in a bilateral monopoly position with the buyer. We show that this gives rise to three inefficiencies: inefficient renegotiation, inefficient production and ineffi- cient design. We derive the welfare optimal direct mechanism that implements the efficient allocation at the lowest possible cost to the buyer. The direct mechanism, however, imposes strong assumptions on the buyer’s prior knowledge of possible flaws and their payoff consequences. Therefore, we also propose an indirect me- chanism that implements the same allocation but does not require any such prior knowledge. The optimal direct and indirect mechanisms separate the improvement of the design and the selection of the seller who produces the good.
Keywords:
procurement; renegotiation; auctions; design flaws; adaption costs; behavioral contract theory;
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Discussion Paper No. 43
Additional Career Assistance and Educational Outcomes for Students in Lower Track Secondary Schools
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Based on local policy variation, this paper estimates the causal effect of additional career assistance on educational outcomes for students in Lower Track Secondary Schools in Germany. We find mostly insignificant effects of the treatment on average outcomes, which mask quite heterogeneous effects. For those students, who are taking extra coursework to continue education, the grade point average is unaffected and the likelihood of completing a Middle Track Secondary School degree falls. In contrast, educational outcomes improve for students who do not take extra coursework. Hence, the treatment causes a reversal of educational plans after graduation.
Keywords:
lower track secondary schools; career guidance; educational upgrading;
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Discussion Paper No. 46
Measuring the Spillovers of Venture Capital
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We provide the first measurement of knowledge spillovers from venture capital-financed companies onto the patenting activities of other companies. On average, these spillovers are nine times larger than those generated by the R&D investment of established compa- nies. Spillover effects are larger in complex product industries than in discrete product industries. Start-ups with experienced inventors holding a patent at the time of receiv- ing the first round of investment produce the largest spillovers, indicating that venture capital fosters the commercialization of technologies. Methodologically, we contribute by developing a novel definition of the spillover pool, combining citation-based and technological proximity-based approaches.
Keywords:
venture capital; spillovers; innovation;
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