Discussion Paper No. 73
November 4, 2021
An Experiment on Social Mislearning
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We investigate experimentally whether social learners appreciate the redundancy of information conveyed by their observed predecessors' actions. Each participant observes a private signal and enters an estimate of the sum of all earlier-moving participants' signals plus her own. In a first treatment, participants move single-file and observe all predecessors' entries; Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) predicts that each participant simply add her signal to her immediate predecessor's entry. Although 75% of participants do so, redundancy neglect by the other 25% generates excess imitation and mild inefficiencies. In a second treatment, participants move four per period; BNE predicts that most players anti-imitate some observed entries. Such anti-imitation occurs in 35% of the most transparent cases, and 16% overall. The remaining redundancy neglect creates dramatic excess imitation and inefficiencies: late-period entries are far too extreme, and on average participants would earn substantially more by ignoring their predecessors altogether.
Keywords:
social learning; redundancy neglect; experiments; higher-order beliefs;
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Discussion Paper No. 72
The Term Structure of Sharpe Ratios and Arbitrage-Free Asset Pricing in Continuous Time
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Recent empirical studies suggest a downward sloping term structure of Sharpe ratios. We present a theoretical framework in continuous time that can cope with such a non-flat forward curve of risk prices. The approach departs from an arbitrage-free and incomplete market setting when different pricing measures are possible. Involved pricing measures now depend on the time of evaluation or the maturity of payoffs. This results in a time inconsistent pricing scheme. The dynamics can be captured by a time-delayed backward stochastic Volterra integral equation, which to the best of our knowledge, has not yet been studied.
Keywords:
term structures; sharpe ratio; incomplete markets; asset pricing; time inconsistency; arbitrage; (time-delayed) volterra equations;
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Discussion Paper No. 71
The Effect of Incentives in Non-Routine Analytical Team Tasks - Evidence From a Field Experiment
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Despite the prevalence of non-routine analytical team tasks in modern economies, little is known about how incentives influence performance in these tasks. In a field experiment with more than 3000 participants, we document a positive effect of bonus incentives on the probability of completion of such a task. Bonus incentives increase performance due to the reward rather than the reference point (performance threshold) they provide. The framing of bonuses (as gains or losses) plays a minor role. Incentives improve performance also in an additional sample of presumably less motivated workers. However, incentives reduce these workers' willingness to "explore" original solutions.
Keywords:
team work; bonus; incentives; loss; gain; non-routine; exploration;
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Discussion Paper No. 69
The Impact of a Negative Labor Demand Shock on Fertility - Evidence From the Fall of the Berlin Wall
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How does a negative labor demand shock impact fertility? I analyze this question in the context of the East German fertility decline after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. I exploit differential pressure for restructuring across East German industries which led to unexpected, exogenous, and permanent changes to labor demand. I find that throughout the 1990s, women more severely impacted by the demand shock had relatively more children than their less-severely-impacted counterparts. Thus, the demand shock did not only depress the aggregate fertility level but also changed the composition of mothers. My paper shows that these two effects do not necessarily operate in the same direction.
Keywords:
J13; J23; P36;
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Discussion Paper No. 70
Signal Sell: Product Lines when Consumers Differ Both in Taste for Quality and Image Concern
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This paper analyzes optimal product lines when consumers differ both in their taste for quality and in their desire for social image. The market outcome features partial pooling and product differentiation that is not driven by heterogeneous valuations for quality but by image concerns. A typical monopoly outcome is a two-tier product line resembling a "masstige" strategy as observed in luxury goods markets. Products can have identical quality and differ only in price and image, thereby rationalizing quality-equivalent line extensions. Under competition, both average quality and market coverage are (weakly) higher but monopoly can yield higher welfare than competition.
Keywords:
image concern; conspicuous consumption; two-dimensional screening; nonlinear pricing;
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Discussion Paper No. 68
Matching with Waiting Times: The German Entry-Level Labor Market for Lawyers
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We study the allocation of German lawyers to regional courts for legal trainee-ships. Because of excess demand in some regions lawyers often have to wait before being allocated. The currently used "Berlin" mechanism is not weakly Pareto efficient, does not eliminate justified envy and does not respect improvements. We introduce a mechanism based on the matching with contracts literature, using waiting time as the contractual term. The resulting mechanism is strategy-proof, weakly Pareto efficient, eliminates justified envy and respects improvements. We extend our proposed mechanism to allow for a more flexible allocation of positions over time.
Keywords:
D47; D82; C78; H75; I28;
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Discussion Paper No. 67
Privacy and Platform Competition
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We analyze platform competition where user data is collected to improve adtargeting. Considering that users incur privacy costs, we show that the equilibrium level of data provision is distorted and can be inefficiently high or low: if overall competition is weak or if targeting benefits are low, too much private data is collected, and vice-versa. Further, we find that softer competition on either market side leads to more data collection, which implies substitutability between competition policy measures on both market sides. Moreover, if platforms engage in two-sided pricing, data provision is efficient.
Keywords:
ad targeting; platform competition; privacy; user data;
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Discussion Paper No. 66
Learning From Unrealized versus Realized Prices
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Our experiments investigate the extent to which traders learn from the price, differentiating between situations where orders are submitted before versus after the price has realized. In simultaneous markets with bids that are conditional on the price, traders neglect the information conveyed by the hypothetical value of the price. In sequential markets where the price is known prior to the bid submission, traders react to price to an extent that is roughly consistent with the benchmark theory. The difference's robustness to a number of variations provides insights about the drivers of this effect.
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Discussion Paper No. 65
Strategic Decentralization and the Provision of Global Public Goods
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We study strategic decentralization in the provision of a global public good. A federation, with the aim of maximizing the aggregate utility of its members, may find it advantageous to decentralize the decision-making, so that its members act autonomously to maximize their own utility. If utility is fully transferable within a federation, the larger a federation is or the more sensitive it is to the public good, the more it has incentives to remain centralized. If an overall increase in the sensitivity to the public good induces some federation(s) to decentralize, it may lead to a decrease in the aggregate provision. With non-transferable utility within a federation, those members that are smaller or less sensitive to the public good are more likely to prefer decentralization. Some members within a federation becoming more sensitive to the public good may thus lead to a lower aggregate provision, because the increased heterogeneity of the federation makes it more inclined to decentralize.
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Discussion Paper No. 64
Fairness in Markets and Market Experiments
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Whether pro-social preferences identified in economic laboratories survive in natural market contexts is an important and contested issue. We investigate how fairness in a laboratory experiment framed explicitly as a market exchange relates to preferences for fair trade products before and after the market experiment. We find that the willingness to buy at a higher price when higher wages are paid to the worker correlates both with the choice for a fair trade product before the laboratory experiment and with whether the participants are willing to pay a positive fair trade premium, elicited at the end of the experiment. These results support the notion that fairness preferences as assessed in laboratory experiments capture preferences for fair behavior in comparable situations outside the laboratory.
Keywords:
fairness; market experiments; external validity; fair trade;
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