Discussion Paper No. 108
November 5, 2021
Effects of Poverty on Impatience
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We study two psychological channels how poverty may increase impatient behavior -- an effect on time preference and reduced attention. We measured discount rates among Ugandan farmers who made decisions about when to enjoy entertainment instead of working. We find that experimentally induced thoughts about poverty-related problems increase the preference to consume entertainment early and delay work. The effect is equivalent to a 27 p.p. increase in the intertemporal rate of substitution. Using monitoring tools similar to eye tracking, a novel feature for this subject pool, we show this effect is not due to a lower ability to sustain attention.
Keywords:
poverty; scarcity; time discounting; inattention; decision-making process; preferences;
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Discussion Paper No. 107
Sanctioning and Trustworthiness Across Ethnic Groups
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We show how sanctioning is more effective in increasing cooperation between groups than within groups. We study this using a trust game among ethnically diverse subjects in Afghanistan. In the experiment, we manipulate i) sanctioning and ii) ethnic identity. We find that sanctioning increases trustworthiness in cross-ethnic interactions, but not when applied by a co-ethnic. While we find higher in-group trustworthiness in the absence of sanctioning, the availability and use of the sanction closes this gap. This has important implications for understanding the effect of institutions in developing societies where ethnic identity is salient. Our results suggest that formal institutions for enforcing cooperation are more effective when applied between, rather than within, ethnic groups, due to behavioral differences in how individuals respond to sanctions.
Keywords:
sanctions; cooperation; crowding out; moral incentives; ethnicity; afghanistan;
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Discussion Paper No. 106
Relational Contracts with Private Information on the Future Value of the Relationship
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We analyze a relational contracting problem, in which the principal has private information about the future value of the relationship. In order to reduce bonus payments, the principal is tempted to claim that the value of the future relationship is lower than it actually is. To induce truth-telling, the optimal relational contract may introduce distortions after a bad report. For some levels of the discount factor, output is reduced by more than would be sequentially optimal. This distortion is attenuated over time even if prospects remain bad. Our model thus provides an alternative explanation for indirect short-run costs of downsizing.
Keywords:
relational contracts; sequential inefficiencies; downsizing;
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Discussion Paper No. 105
Aggregate Information and Organizational Structures
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We study an organization with a top management (principal) and multiple subunits (agents) with private information that determine the organization's aggregate efficiency. Under centralization, eliciting the agents' private information may induce the principal to manipulate aggregate information, which obstructs an effective use of information for the organization. Under delegation, the principal concedes more information rent, but is able to use the agents' information more effectively. The trade-off between the organizational structures depends on the likelihood that the agents are efficient. Centralization is optimal when such likelihood is low. Delegation, by contrast, is optimal when it is high.
Keywords:
D82; D86;
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Discussion Paper No. 104
Growing Up in Ethnic Enclaves: Language Proficiency and Educational Attainment of Immigrant Children
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Does a high regional concentration of immigrants of the same ethnicity affect immigrant children's acquisition of host-country language skills and educational attainment? We exploit the exogenous placement of guest workers from five ethnicities across German regions during the 1960s and 1970s in a model with region and ethnicity fixed effects. Our results indicate that exposure to a higher own-ethnic concentration impairs immigrant children's host-country language proficiency and increases school dropout. A key mediating factor for this effect is parents' lower speaking proficiency in the host-country language, whereas inter-ethnic contacts with natives and economic conditions do not play a role.
Keywords:
immigrant children; ethnic concentration; language; education; guest workers;
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Discussion Paper No. 103
Approximate Expected Utility Rationalization
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We propose a new measure of deviations from expected utility, given data on economic choices under risk and uncertainty. In a revealed preference setup, and given a positive number e, we provide a characterization of the datasets whose deviation (in beliefs, utility, or perceived prices) is within e of expected utility theory. The number e can then be used as a distance to the theory. We apply our methodology to three recent large-scale experiments. Many subjects in those experiments are consistent with utility maximization, but not expected utility maximization. The correlation of our measure with demographics is also interesting, and provides new and intuitive findings on expected utility.
Keywords:
expected utility; revealed preference;
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Discussion Paper No. 102
Net Neutrality, Prioritization and the Impact of Content Delivery Networks
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We analyze competition between Internet Service Providers (ISPs) where consumers demand heterogeneous content within two Quality-of-Service (QoS) regimes, Net Neutrality and Paid Prioritization, and show that paid prioritization increases the static efficiency compared to a neutral network. We also consider paid prioritization intermediated by Content Delivery Networks (CDNs). While the use of CDNs is welfare neutral, it results in higher consumer prices for internet access. Regarding incentives to invest in network capacity we show that discriminatory regimes lead to higher incentives than the neutral regime as long as capacity is scarce, while investment is highest in the presence of CDNs.
Keywords:
content delivery network; investment; net neutrality; prioritization;
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Discussion Paper No. 101
Labor Market and Distributional Effects of an Increase in the Retirement Age
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We evaluate the labor market and distributional effects of an increase in the early retirement age (ERA) from 60 to 63 for women. We use a regression discontinuity design which exploits the immediate increase in the ERA between women born in 1951 and 1952. The analysis is based on the German micro census which includes about 370,000 households per year. We focus on heterogeneous labor market effects on the individual and on the household level and we study the distributional implications using net household income. In this respect we extend the previous literature which mainly studied employment effects on the individual level. Our results show sizable labor market effects which strongly differ by subgroups. We document larger employment effects for women who cannot rely on other income on the household level, e.g. women with a low income partner. The distributional analysis shows on average no significant effects on female or household income. This result holds as well for heterogeneous groups: Even for the most vulnerable groups, such as single women, women without higher education, or low partner income, we do not find significant reductions in income. One reason for this result is program substitution.
Keywords:
retirement age; pension reform; labor supply; early retirement; distributional effects; spillover effects; household;
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Discussion Paper No. 100
November 4, 2021
Sweet Lemons: Mitigating Collusion in Organizations
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This paper shows that the possibility of collusion between an agent and a supervisor imposes no restrictions on the set of implementable social choice functions (SCF) and associated payoff vectors. Any SCF and any payoff profile that are implementable if the supervisor′s information was public is also implementable when this information is private and collusion is possible. To implement a given SCF we propose a one-sided mechanism that endogenously creates private information for the supervisor vis-à-vis the agent, and conditions both players′ payoffs on this endogenous information. We show that in such a mechanism all collusive side-bargaining fails, similar to the trade failure in Akerlof′s (1970) car market and in models of bilateral trade.
Keywords:
mechanism design; collusion; asymmetric information; correlation;
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Discussion Paper No. 99
Multinational Banks in Regulated Markets: Financial Integration Desirable?
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We set up a two-country, regional model of trade in financial services. Competitive firms in each country manufacture non-traded consumer goods in an uncertain productive environment, borrowing funds from a bank in either the home or the foreign market. Duopolistic banks can choose their levels of monitoring of firms and thus the levels of risk-taking, where the risk of bank failure is partly borne by taxpayers in the banks' home countries. Moreover, each bank chooses the allocation of its lending between domestic and foreign firms, while the bank's overall loan volume is fixed by a capital requirement set optimally in its home country. In this setting we consider two types of financial integration. A reduction in the compliance costs of cross-border banking reduces aggregate output and increases risk-taking, thus harming consumers and taxpayers in both countries. In contrast, a reduction in the costs of screening foreign firms is likely to be eneficial for banks, consumers, and taxpayers alike.
Keywords:
multinational banks; foreign direct investment; capital regulation; financial integration;
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