Discussion Paper No. 483
December 20, 2023
Are Women in Science Less Ambitious than Men? Experimental Evidence on the Role of Gender and STEM in Promotion Applications
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Abstract:
The gender wage gap is to a significant extent driven by gender-based job segregation. One of the potential culprits can be found in supply-side behavioral differences in promotion applications. In this study, using a controlled lab experiment, we disentangle the roles of gender, field of study, and task difficulty in promotion application decisions. Our study pro- vides three crucial findings. First, gender differences in self-limiting promotion application behavior are only present in STEM field students when exposed to a male task. Specifi- cally, when an easier alternative is available, women are less willing to apply for promotions concerning harder tasks than men. Second, there exists no significant difference between men’s and women’s willingness to apply for promotion concerning female jobs in STEM or non-STEM fields. Third, we find that previously reported gender differences in confidence are present only between STEM field students. The results also suggest that self-sorting into positions does not cause a decrease in overall welfare, however, it causes fewer promotions for women in STEM. We finally propose an easy-to-implement policy intervention to close the gender gap in STEM students when applying for a promotion.
Keywords:
gender differences; promotion application; self-limiting behavior; hierarchical segregation; STEM; male task; experiment;
JEL-Classification:
D91; J16; J62; C91;
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Discussion Paper No. 482
December 15, 2023
When Zeros Count: Confounding in Preference Heterogeneity and Attribute Non-attendance
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Abstract:
Identifying consumer heterogeneity is a central topic in marketing. While the main focus has been on developing models and estimation procedures that allow uncovering consumer heterogeneity in preferences, a new stream of literature has focused on models that account for consumers’ heterogeneous attribute information usage. These models acknowledge that consumers may ignore subsets of attributes when making decisions, also commonly termed “attribute nonattendance" (ANA). In this paper, we explore the performance of choice models that explicitly account for ANA across ten different applications, which vary in terms of the choice context, the associated financial risk, and the complexity of the purchase decision. We systematically compare five different models that either neglect ANA and preference heterogeneity, account only for one at a time, or account for both across these applications. First, we showcase that ANA occurs across all ten applications. It prevails even in simple settings and high-stakes decisions. Second, we contribute by examining the direction and the magnitude of biases in parameters. We find that the location of zero with regard to the preference distribution affects the expected direction of biases in preference heterogeneity (i.e., variance) parameters. Neglecting ANA when the preference distribution is away from zero, often related to whether the attribute enables vertical differentiation of products, may lead to an overestimation of preference heterogeneity. In contrast, neglecting ANA when the preference distribution spreads on both sides of zero, often related to attributes enabling horizontal differentiation, may lead to an underestimation of preference heterogeneity. Lastly, we present how the empirical results translate into managerial implications and provide guidance to practitioners on when these models are beneficial.
Keywords:
choice modeling; preference heterogeneity; attribute non-attendance; inattention;
JEL-Classification:
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Discussion Paper No. 481
Mapping the Dynamics of Management Styles— Evidence from German Survey Data
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We study how firms adjust the bundles of management practices they adopt over time, using repeated survey data collected in Germany from 2012 to 2018. By employing unsupervised machine learning, we leverage high-dimensional data on human resource policies to describe clusters of management practices (management styles). Our results suggest that two management styles exist, one of which employs many and highly structured practices, while the other lacks these practices but retains training measures. We document sizeable differences in styles across German firms, which can (only) partially be explained by firm characteristics. Further, we show that management is highly persistent over time, in part because newly adopted practices are discontinued after a short time. We suggest miscalculations of cots-benefit trade-offs and non-fitting corporate culture as potential hindrances of adopting structured management. In light of previous findings that structured management increases firm performance, our findings have important policy implications since they show that firms which are managed in an unstructured way fail to catch up and will continue to underperform.
Keywords:
management practices; personnel management; panel data analysis; machine learning;
JEL-Classification:
M12; D22; C38;
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Discussion Paper No. 480
When Protection Becomes Exploitation: The Impact of Firing Costs on Present-Biased Employees
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Employment protection harms early-career employees without benefitting them in later career stages (Leonardi and Pica, 2013). We demonstrate that this pattern can result from employers exploiting na¨ıve present-biased employees. Employers offer a dynamic contract with low early-career wages, an unattractive intermediate qualification stage, and high end-of-career wages. Upon reaching the qualification stage, present-biased employees exchange future wages for immediate rewards on an alternative career path – a choice unanticipated by their previous, na¨ıve, self. Thus, employers never pay high future wages. Firing costs help employers indicate that they will not oust employees instead of making promised payments, enabling early-career wage cuts.
Keywords:
employment protection laws; present bias; dynamic contracting;
JEL-Classification:
D21; D90; J33; K31; M52;
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Discussion Paper No. 479
December 13, 2023
Do We Talk Too Much?
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We consider the trade-off between talking and listening in a laboratory experiment where two team members need to coordinate on the use of an information channel. Each team member indicates their preference to “talk” and share her own information with her teammate, or to “listen” and obtain knowledge of the teammate’s information. The nature of the information varies across treatments. For stylized urns-and-balls treatments, we formalize a version of the “hard-easy effect” of over- and under-confidence: players talk more in situations where information is relatively precise – not only for the talker but also for the listener. Indeed we find that a more precise information structure induces a higher talking frequency, with a difference of 5 percentage points, relative to a baseline of 48 percent. The game-theoretic equilibrium, with rational expectations, predicts no such treatment effect. In treatments where information arises from real-world contexts, the hard-easy effect on the talking frequency is even stronger, at about 13 percentage points, relative to a baseline of about 38 percent.
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JEL-Classification:
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Discussion Paper No. 478
Public Appeals and Collective Crisis Mitigation
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Arrivals of crises often trigger public appeals by policy leaders, attempting to motivate crisis-mitigating behaviors. We run a controlled experiment among a general-population sample to investigate the impact of such appeals and of their tonality. Varying the language, an identical content of the appeal—a plea to contribute to mitigating a crisis—is formulated with either positive or negative wordings. Relative to the case with no appeal, both types of appeals successfully raise contributions, each by about 20 percent. A separate sample of policy-makers is presented with our design and asked to estimate the effect of the appeals. They correctly predict the effect of the positively worded appeal but fail to predict the effect of the negatively worded one.
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JEL-Classification:
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Discussion Paper No. 477
Attempting to Detect a Lie: Do We Think it Through?
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Game-theoretic analyses of communication rely on beliefs – especially, the receiver’s belief about the truth status of an utterance and the sender’s belief about the reaction to the utterance – but research that provides measurements of such beliefs is still in its infancy. Our experiment examines the use of second-order beliefs, measuring belief hierarchies regarding a message that may be a lie. In a two-player communication game between a sender and a receiver, the sender knows the state of the world and has a transparent incentive to deceive the receiver. The receiver chooses a binary reaction. For a wide set of non-equilibrium beliefs, the reaction and the receiver’s second-order belief should dissonate: she should follow the sender’s statement if and only if she believes that the sender believes that she does not follow the statement. The opposite is true empirically, constituting a new pattern of inconsistency between actions and beliefs.
Keywords:
strategic information transmission; lying; higher-order beliefs;
JEL-Classification:
D01; D83;
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Discussion Paper No. 476
Overcoming Time Inconsistency with a Matched Bet: Theory and Evidence from Exercising
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This paper introduces the matched-bet mechanism. The matched bet is an easily applicable and strictly budget-balanced mechanism that aims to help people overcome time-inconsistent behavior. I show theoretically that offering a matched bet helps both sophisticated and naive procrastinators to reduce time-inconsistent behavior. A field experiment on exercising confirms the theoretical predictions: offering a matched bet has a significant positive effect on gym attendance. Self-reported procrastinators are significantly more likely to take up the matched bet. Overall, the matched bet proves a promising device to help people not to procrastinate.
Keywords:
monetary incentives; market design; field experiment; health behavior;
JEL-Classification:
C93; D47; D90; I12;
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Discussion Paper No. 475
Should Individuals Choose their Own Incentives? Evidence from a Mindfulness Meditation Intervention
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Traditionally, incentives to promote behavioral change are assigned rather than chosen. In this paper, we theoretically and empirically investigate the alternative approach of letting people choose their own incentives from a menu of increasingly challenging and rewarding options. When individuals are heterogeneous and have private information about their costs and benefits, we theoretically show that leaving them the choice of incentives can improve both adherence and welfare. We test the theoretical predictions in a field experiment based on daily meditation sessions. We randomly assign some participants to one of two incentive schemes and allow others to choose between the two schemes. As predicted, participants sort into schemes in (partial) agreement with the objectives of the policy maker. However, in contrast to our prediction, participants who could choose complete significantly fewer sessions than participants that were randomly assigned. Since the results are not driven by poor selection, we infer that letting people choose between incentive schemes may bring in psychological effects that discourage adherence.
Keywords:
monetary incentives; dynamic incentives; field experiment; mental health;
JEL-Classification:
C09; D03; D08; I01;
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Discussion Paper No. 474
Breaking the Silence: Group Discussions, and the Adoption of Welfare-Improving Technologies
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Social pressure and stigma can hinder the adoption of available technologies, especially in the context of sensitive health issues. We run a field experiment on the take-up of menstrual products in Bangladesh and test a discussion-based intervention in a work setting. We vary participation in group discussions designed to break the silence around menstruation, where colleagues share their personal experiences. We find positive effects on the willingness to pay for a known menstrual product (sanitary pads) and on the adoption of a new technology (anti-bacterial menstrual underwear). Our results show changes in restrictive social norms around purchasing the products and lower perceived stigma around menstruation in general.
Keywords:
social norms; social pressure; stigma; technology adoption; group discussions; menstrual health management; menstrual hygiene; adverse health behavior;
JEL-Classification:
D91; I12; I15; O12;