Discussion Paper No. 339
November 30, 2022
The Empirics of Economic Growth Over Time and Across Nations: A Unified Growth Perspective
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This research develops an expanded unified growth theory that incorporates the endogenous accumulation of physical capital, population, human capital, and technology. The model incorporates a complementarity between physical capital and human capital and can be extended to a multi-country setting with international technology diffusion. The analytical characterization of the mechanisms behind the observed patterns of long-run growth and comparative development delivers a consistent explanation for a large set of seemingly unrelated empirical facts. A quantitative multi-country version of the model matches various empirical regularities of long-run growth dynamics and comparative development patterns that have previously been studied in isolation. The findings also shed new light on the role of the demographic transition for convergence patterns, the specification of cross-country growth regressions, technology spillovers, and the secular stagnation debate.
Keywords:
unified growth; long-run development; demographic transition; secular stagnation;
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Discussion Paper No. 338
Does Demography Determine Democratic Attitudes?
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This paper presents new evidence on how demography affects democratic attitudes in Western democracies. Using individual survey responses, the empirical analysis disentangles age from cohort patterns and other contemporaneous economic and political influences that shape democratic attitudes. The results reveal that support for democracy increases with age and is lower for more recent birth cohorts. These patterns are more pronounced in Western democracies than in the former Eastern bloc and in other countries around the world. Additional findings document that demography's effect partly captures heterogeneity in experiences with democracy, and that socioeconomic factors impact democratic attitudes.
Keywords:
support for democracy; age-periods-cohort models; population aging; demographic composition; stability of democracy; modernization hypothesis;
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Discussion Paper No. 337
Non-Additivity of Subjective Expectations over Different Time Intervals
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We examine the additivity of stock-market expectations over different time intervals. When asked about a ten-year interval, survey respondents expect a stock-price change that is not equal to, but closer to zero than, the sum of their expectations over two shorter time intervals that cover the same ten years. Such sub-additivity is irrational in that it cannot stem from aggregating short-term expectations. Model estimates show that the pattern is consistent with a time perception where shorter time intervals have a proportionally larger weight. We also find that the respondents' degree of additivity is correlated with making larger financial investments.
Keywords:
expectation formation; time perception; sub-additivity; super-additivity;
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Discussion Paper No. 336
Attracting Profit Shifting or Fostering Innovation? On Patent Boxes and R&D Subsidies
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Many countries have introduced patent box regimes in recent years, offering a reduced tax rate to businesses for their IP-related income. In this paper, we analyze the effects of patent box regimes when countries can simultaneously use patent boxes and R&D subsidies to promote innovation. We show that when countries set their tax policies non-cooperatively, innovation is fostered, at the margin, only by the R&D subsidy, whereas the patent box tax rate is targeted at attracting international profit shifting. In equilibrium, patent box regimes emerge endogenously under policy competition, but never under policy coordination. We also compare the competition for mobile patents with the competition for mobile R&D units and show that enforcing a nexus principle is likely to reduce the aggressiveness of patent box regimes.
Keywords:
corporate taxation; profit shifting; patent boxes; R&D tax credits; tax competition;
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Discussion Paper No. 335
Incentives, Globalization, and Redistribution
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We offer a new explanation for why taxes have become less redistributive in many countries in parallel with an increase in income concentration. When performance-based contracts are needed to incentivize effort, redistribution through progressive income taxes becomes less precisely targeted. Taxation reduces after-tax income inequality but undermines performance-based contracts, lowering effort and raising pre-tax income differentials. Product market integration can widen the spread of project returns and make contract choices more responsive to changes in the level of taxation, resulting in a lower optimal income tax rate even when individuals are not inter-jurisdictionally mobile.
Keywords:
performance contracts; market integration; redistributive taxation;
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Discussion Paper No. 334
Aversion to Hiring Algorithms: Transparency, Gender Profiling, and Self-Confidence
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We run an online experiment to study the origins of algorithm aversion. Participants are either in the role of workers or of managers. Workers perform three real-effort tasks: task 1, task 2, and the job task which is a combination of tasks 1 and 2. They choose whether the hiring decision between themselves and another worker is made either by a participant in the role of a manager or by an algorithm. In a second set of experiments, managers choose whether they want to delegate their hiring decisions to the algorithm. In the baseline treatments, we observe that workers choose the manager more often than the algorithm, and managers also prefer to make the hiring decisions themselves rather than delegate them to the algorithm. When the algorithm does not use workers' gender to predict their job task performance and workers know this, they choose the algorithm more often. Providing details on how the algorithm works does not increase the preference for the algorithm, neither for workers nor for managers. Providing feedback to managers about their performance in hiring the best workers increases their preference for the algorithm, as managers are, on average, overconfident.
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Discussion Paper No. 333
August 15, 2022
The Dynamics of Behavioral Responses During a Crisis
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This paper investigates the dynamics of behavioral changes during a crisis. We study this in the context of the first year of the Covid-19 pandemic, where behavioral responses were important in mitigating the costs of the pandemic. To identify behavioral responses to unanticipated and transient health risk shocks, we combine high-frequency cellphone mobility data with detailed incidence data in Germany. Using an event-study design on local outbreaks, we find that county-level mobility immediately and significantly decreased by about 2.5% in response to an outbreak independent of non-pharmaceutical interventions. We also find that the reproduction rate decreased by about 17% in response to a local outbreak. Both behavioral responses are quite persistent even after the relative health risk has dissipated. By the time of the second wave, the behavioral response to a second or third shock is small or negligible. Our results demonstrate the importance of (1) integrating behavioral persistence in models used to study behavior and policies that change behavior, (2) the effectiveness of policies that provide high-frequency localized information on health risks, and (3) the potential persistence of behavioral changes after the Covid-19 pandemic has passed.
Keywords:
dynamics; behavioral response; crisis; covid-19;
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Discussion Paper No. 332
July 21, 2022
Cooperation, Competition, and Welfare in a Matching Market
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We investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two-sided matching market, where matched pairs play an infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Higher matching efficiency is usually considered detrimental as it creates stronger incentives for defection. We point out, however, that a reduction in matching frictions also increases welfare because more agents find themselves in a cooperative relationship. We characterize the conditions for which increasing competition increases overall welfare. In particular, this is always the case when the incentives for defection are high.
Keywords:
cooperation; prisoner's dilemma; competition; welfare; matching; trust building;
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Discussion Paper No. 331
July 7, 2022
Charitable Giving by the Poor A Field Experiment in Kyrgyzstan
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In a large-scale natural field experiment, we partnered with a micro-lending company in Kyrgyzstan that asked over 180,000 of its clients for donations to social projects as a form of corporate philanthropy. In a 2×2 design, we explored two main (pre-registered) hypotheses about giving by the poor. First, based on a conjecture that poor are more price sensitive than the rich and in contrast to previous studies, we hypothesize that matching incentives induce crowding in of out-of-pocket donations. Second, we hypothesize that our population cares about their proximity to the charitable project. We find evidence in favor of the former hypothesis but not the latter. Previous studies of charitable giving focus on middle- or high-income earners in Western countries, neglecting the poor, although the lowest income groups are often shown to contribute substantial shares of their income to charitable causes. Our results challenge the evidence in the extant literature but are in line with our theoretical model. The implications for fundraising managers are that the optimal design of fundraising campaigns crucially depends on the targeted groups, and that donation matching is successful in stimulating participation in poorer populations.
Keywords:
charity giving; field experiments; matching donations;
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Discussion Paper No. 329
May 18, 2022
Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations
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Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from classical moral-hazard settings. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties. I show that the (implicit) assumption of deterministic contracts makes payments to third parties necessary. This paper studies incentive contracts with stochastic compensation, like payments in stock options or uncertain arbitration procedures. These contracts incentivize employees without the need for payments to third parties. In addition, stochastic contracts can be more efficient and can make the principal better off compared to deterministic contracts. My results also address the puzzle about the prevalence of labor contracts with stochastic compensation.
Keywords:
Subjective evaluations; Stochastic contracts; Stochastic compensation; Budget-balanced contracts; Moral Hazard; Subjective performance measures; Incentives;
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