Discussion Paper No. 336
November 30, 2022
Attracting Profit Shifting or Fostering Innovation? On Patent Boxes and R&D Subsidies
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Many countries have introduced patent box regimes in recent years, offering a reduced tax rate to businesses for their IP-related income. In this paper, we analyze the effects of patent box regimes when countries can simultaneously use patent boxes and R&D subsidies to promote innovation. We show that when countries set their tax policies non-cooperatively, innovation is fostered, at the margin, only by the R&D subsidy, whereas the patent box tax rate is targeted at attracting international profit shifting. In equilibrium, patent box regimes emerge endogenously under policy competition, but never under policy coordination. We also compare the competition for mobile patents with the competition for mobile R&D units and show that enforcing a nexus principle is likely to reduce the aggressiveness of patent box regimes.
Keywords:
corporate taxation; profit shifting; patent boxes; R&D tax credits; tax competition;
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Discussion Paper No. 335
Incentives, Globalization, and Redistribution
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We offer a new explanation for why taxes have become less redistributive in many countries in parallel with an increase in income concentration. When performance-based contracts are needed to incentivize effort, redistribution through progressive income taxes becomes less precisely targeted. Taxation reduces after-tax income inequality but undermines performance-based contracts, lowering effort and raising pre-tax income differentials. Product market integration can widen the spread of project returns and make contract choices more responsive to changes in the level of taxation, resulting in a lower optimal income tax rate even when individuals are not inter-jurisdictionally mobile.
Keywords:
performance contracts; market integration; redistributive taxation;
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Discussion Paper No. 334
Aversion to Hiring Algorithms: Transparency, Gender Profiling, and Self-Confidence
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We run an online experiment to study the origins of algorithm aversion. Participants are either in the role of workers or of managers. Workers perform three real-effort tasks: task 1, task 2, and the job task which is a combination of tasks 1 and 2. They choose whether the hiring decision between themselves and another worker is made either by a participant in the role of a manager or by an algorithm. In a second set of experiments, managers choose whether they want to delegate their hiring decisions to the algorithm. In the baseline treatments, we observe that workers choose the manager more often than the algorithm, and managers also prefer to make the hiring decisions themselves rather than delegate them to the algorithm. When the algorithm does not use workers' gender to predict their job task performance and workers know this, they choose the algorithm more often. Providing details on how the algorithm works does not increase the preference for the algorithm, neither for workers nor for managers. Providing feedback to managers about their performance in hiring the best workers increases their preference for the algorithm, as managers are, on average, overconfident.
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Discussion Paper No. 333
August 15, 2022
The Dynamics of Behavioral Responses During a Crisis
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This paper investigates the dynamics of behavioral changes during a crisis. We study this in the context of the first year of the Covid-19 pandemic, where behavioral responses were important in mitigating the costs of the pandemic. To identify behavioral responses to unanticipated and transient health risk shocks, we combine high-frequency cellphone mobility data with detailed incidence data in Germany. Using an event-study design on local outbreaks, we find that county-level mobility immediately and significantly decreased by about 2.5% in response to an outbreak independent of non-pharmaceutical interventions. We also find that the reproduction rate decreased by about 17% in response to a local outbreak. Both behavioral responses are quite persistent even after the relative health risk has dissipated. By the time of the second wave, the behavioral response to a second or third shock is small or negligible. Our results demonstrate the importance of (1) integrating behavioral persistence in models used to study behavior and policies that change behavior, (2) the effectiveness of policies that provide high-frequency localized information on health risks, and (3) the potential persistence of behavioral changes after the Covid-19 pandemic has passed.
Keywords:
dynamics; behavioral response; crisis; covid-19;
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Discussion Paper No. 332
July 21, 2022
Cooperation, Competition, and Welfare in a Matching Market
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We investigate the welfare effect of increasing competition in an anonymous two-sided matching market, where matched pairs play an infinitely repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Higher matching efficiency is usually considered detrimental as it creates stronger incentives for defection. We point out, however, that a reduction in matching frictions also increases welfare because more agents find themselves in a cooperative relationship. We characterize the conditions for which increasing competition increases overall welfare. In particular, this is always the case when the incentives for defection are high.
Keywords:
cooperation; prisoner's dilemma; competition; welfare; matching; trust building;
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Discussion Paper No. 331
July 7, 2022
Charitable Giving by the Poor A Field Experiment in Kyrgyzstan
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In a large-scale natural field experiment, we partnered with a micro-lending company in Kyrgyzstan that asked over 180,000 of its clients for donations to social projects as a form of corporate philanthropy. In a 2×2 design, we explored two main (pre-registered) hypotheses about giving by the poor. First, based on a conjecture that poor are more price sensitive than the rich and in contrast to previous studies, we hypothesize that matching incentives induce crowding in of out-of-pocket donations. Second, we hypothesize that our population cares about their proximity to the charitable project. We find evidence in favor of the former hypothesis but not the latter. Previous studies of charitable giving focus on middle- or high-income earners in Western countries, neglecting the poor, although the lowest income groups are often shown to contribute substantial shares of their income to charitable causes. Our results challenge the evidence in the extant literature but are in line with our theoretical model. The implications for fundraising managers are that the optimal design of fundraising campaigns crucially depends on the targeted groups, and that donation matching is successful in stimulating participation in poorer populations.
Keywords:
charity giving; field experiments; matching donations;
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Discussion Paper No. 329
May 18, 2022
Stochastic Contracts and Subjective Evaluations
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Subjective evaluations are widely used, but call for different contracts from classical moral-hazard settings. Previous literature shows that contracts require payments to third parties. I show that the (implicit) assumption of deterministic contracts makes payments to third parties necessary. This paper studies incentive contracts with stochastic compensation, like payments in stock options or uncertain arbitration procedures. These contracts incentivize employees without the need for payments to third parties. In addition, stochastic contracts can be more efficient and can make the principal better off compared to deterministic contracts. My results also address the puzzle about the prevalence of labor contracts with stochastic compensation.
Keywords:
Subjective evaluations; Stochastic contracts; Stochastic compensation; Budget-balanced contracts; Moral Hazard; Subjective performance measures; Incentives;
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Discussion Paper No. 328
May 12, 2022
Personalized Fundraising: A Field Experiment on Threshold Matching of Donations
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We study a form of threshold matching in fundraising where donations above a certain threshold are topped up with a fixed amount. We show theoretically that threshold matching can induce crowding in if appropriately personalized. In a field experiment, we explore how thresholds should be chosen depending on past donations. The optimal choice of thresholds is rather bold, approximately 75% above past donations. Additionally, we explore how thresholds should be set for new donors as a function of their personal characteristics and demonstrate the benefits of personalization as opposed to setting a general threshold that applies to all recipients of a fundraising call.
Keywords:
charitable giving; field experiments; matching donations; personalization;
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Discussion Paper No. 327
May 5, 2022
Portfolio Liquidation Games with Self-Exciting Order Flow
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We analyze novel portfolio liquidation games with self-exciting order flow. Both the $N$-player game and the mean-field game are considered. We assume that players' trading activities have an impact on the dynamics of future market order arrivals thereby generating an additional transient price impact. Given the strategies of her competitors each player solves a mean-field control problem. We characterize open-loop Nash equilibria in both games in terms of a novel mean-field FBSDE system with unknown terminal condition. Under a weak interaction condition we prove that the FBSDE systems have unique solutions. Using a novel sufficient maximum principle that does not require convexity of the cost function we finally prove that the solution of the FBSDE systems do indeed provide open-loop Nash equilibria.
Keywords:
stochastic games; mean-field games; portfolio liquidation; Hawkes process; singular terminal value;
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Discussion Paper No. 326
Voluntary 'Donations' versus Reward-Oriented 'Contributions': Two Experiments on Framing in Funding Mechanisms
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In an artefactual field experiment, we implemented a crowdfunding campaign for an institute's summer party and compared donation and contribution framings. We found that the use of the word 'donation' generated higher revenue than the use of 'contribution'. While the individuals receiving the donation framing gave substantially larger amounts, those receiving the contribution framing responded more strongly to reward thresholds and suggestions. An additional survey experiment on MTurk indicated that the term 'donation' triggers more positive emotional responses and that emotions are highly correlated with giving. It appears that making a donation is perceived as a more voluntary act and is thus more successful at generating warm glow than making a contribution. We surmise that this extends to other funding mechanisms.
Keywords:
crowdfunding; field experiment; framing;
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