Discussion Paper No. 388
February 27, 2023
Reciprocal Preferences in Matching Markets
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Abstract:
Agents with reciprocal preferences prefer to be matched to a partner who also likes to collaborate with them. In this paper, we introduce and formalize reciprocal preferences, apply them to matching markets, and analyze the implications for mechanism design. Formally, the preferences of an agent can depend on the preferences of potential partners and there is incomplete information about the partners’ preferences. We find that there is no stable mechanism in standard two-sided markets. Observing the final allocation of the mechanism enables agents to learn about each other's preferences, leading to instability. However, in a school choice setting with one side of the market being non-strategic, modified versions of the deferred acceptance mechanism can achieve stability. These results provide insights into non-standard preferences in matching markets, and their implications for efficient information and mechanism design.
Keywords:
market design; matching; reciprocal preferences; non-standard preferences; gale-shapley deferred acceptance mechanism; incomplete information;
JEL-Classification:
C78; D47; D82; D83; D91;
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Discussion Paper No. 387
Transparency and Policy Competition: Experimental Evidence from German Citizens and Politicians
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Abstract:
A lack of transparency about policy performance can pose a major obstacle to welfare-enhancing policy competition across jurisdictions. In parallel surveys with German citizens and state parliamentarians, we document that both groups misperceive the performance of their state’s education system. Experimentally providing performance information polarizes citizens’ political satisfaction between high- and low-performing states and increases their demand for greater transparency of states’ educational performance. Parliamentarians’ support for the transparency policy is opportunistic: Performance information increases (decreases) policy support in high-performing (low-performing) states. We conclude that increasing the public salience of educational performance information may incentivize politicians to implement welfare-enhancing reforms.
Keywords:
yardstick competition; beliefs; information; citizens; politicians; survey experiment;
JEL-Classification:
H11; I28; D83;
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Discussion Paper No. 386
Measuring Preferences Over Intertemporal Profiles
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Abstract:
Growing evidence indicates that utility over time is different from utility under risk. Hence, measuring intertemporal preferences (discounting and utility) exclusively from intertemporal choices is desirable. We develop a simple method for measuring intertemporal preferences. It is parameter-free in both discounting and utility, and allows a wider range of models to be measured than preceding methods. It is easy to implement, clear to subjects, incentive compatible, and does not require more measurements than existing methods if identical assumptions are imposed. In an experiment, we illustrate how the method can be used to test recent models with unconventional assumptions non-parametrically.
Keywords:
measuring time preferences; intertemporal profile; parameter-free;
JEL-Classification:
C91; D12; D91;
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Discussion Paper No. 385
February 16, 2023
Non-Standard Errors*
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Abstract:
In statistics, samples are drawn from a population in a data-generating process (DGP). Standard errors measure the uncertainty in estimates of population parameters. In science, evidence is generated to test hypotheses in an evidence-generating process (EGP). We claim that EGP variation across researchers adds uncertainty: Non-standard errors (NSEs). We study NSEs by letting 164 teams test the same hypotheses on the same data. NSEs turn out to be sizable, but smaller for better reproducible or higher rated research. Adding peer-review stages reduces NSEs. We further find that this type of uncertainty is underestimated by participants.
Keywords:
uncertainty; standard errors; reproducibility; hypotheses;
JEL-Classification:
C13; C18; C10;
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Discussion Paper No. 384
February 14, 2023
Scared Straight? Threat and Assimilation of Refugees in Germany
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This paper studies the effects of local threat on cultural and economic assimilation of refugees, exploiting plausibly exogenous variation in their allocation across German regions between 2013 and 2016. We combine novel survey data on cultural preferences and economic outcomes of refugees with corresponding information on German respondents, and construct a threat index that integrates contemporaneous and historical variables. On average, refugees assimilate both culturally and economically. However, while refugees assigned to more hostile regions converge to German culture more quickly, they do not exhibit faster economic assimilation. Our evidence suggests that refugees exert more assimilation effort in response to local threat, but that higher discrimination prevents them from integrating more quickly in more hostile regions.
Keywords:
refugees; cultural change; assimilation; identity;
JEL-Classification:
F22; J15; Z10;
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Discussion Paper No. 383
The ifo Education Survey 2014-2021
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Abstract:
The ifo Education Survey is a representative opinion survey of the German voting-age population on education topics that has been conducted annually since 2014. It covers public preferences on a wide range of education policy issues ranging from early childhood education, schools, and apprenticeships to university education and life-long learning. The dataset comprises several survey experiments that facilitate investigating the causal effects of information provision, framing, and question design on answering behavior. This paper gives an overview of the survey content and methodology, describes the data, and explains how researchers can access the dataset of over 4000 participants per wave.
Keywords:
education; policy; survey; experiment; public opinion; political economy; Germany;
JEL-Classification:
I28; D72; H52;
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Discussion Paper No. 382
Risk, Reward and Uncertainty in Buyer-Seller Transactions - The Seller's View on Combining Posted Prices and Auctions -
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In Buy-It-Now auctions, sellers can post a take-it-or-leave-it price offer prior to an auction. While the literature almost exclusively looks at buyers in such combined mechanisms, the current paper summarizes results from the sellers' point of view. Buy-It-Now auctions are complex mechanisms and therefore quite challenging for sellers. The paper discusses the seller's curse, a bias that sellers might fall prey to in such combined mechanisms, and how experience counterbalances this bias. Furthermore, the paper explores the role of information and bargaining power on behavior and profit prospects in Buy-It-Now auctions.
Keywords:
asymmetric information; laboratory experiment; field experiment; auction; BIN-auction; Buy-It-Now auction; BIN-price; Buy-It-Now price; combined mechanism;
JEL-Classification:
C72; C91; D44; D82; L1;
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Discussion Paper No. 381
February 8, 2023
Cognitive Ability and Perceived Disagreement in Learning
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Abstract:
Do agents believe to be agreeing more with others in the long-run? This paper designs an experiment to study how cognitive abilities affect actual and perceived disagreement in a standard sequential belief updating task with public signals. We document a persistent gap in the perception of disagreement as a function of cognitive ability. Higher cognitive ability is associated with less perceived disagreement, although the average subject underestimates the extent of actual disagreement regardless of cognitive ability. Learning about the state of the world has little effect on the evolution of perceived disagreement when controlling for cognitive ability. Providing subjects with information about their partner’s cognitive ability affects perceived disagreement only when the partner is less cognitively able.
Keywords:
cognitive ability; disagreement; learning;
JEL-Classification:
C90; D83; D89;
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Discussion Paper No. 380
Self-serving Bias in Redistribution Choices: Accounting for Beliefs and Norms
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Abstract:
People with higher-incomes tend to support less redistribution than lower-income people. This has been attributed not only to self-interest, but also to psychological mechanisms including differing beliefs about the hard work or luck underlying inequality, differing fairness views, and differing perceptions of social norms. In this study, we directly measure each of these mechanisms and compare their mediating roles in the relationship between status and redistribution. In our experiment, participants complete real-effort tasks and then are randomly assigned a high or low pay rate per correct answer to exogenously induce (dis)advantaged status. Participants are then paired and those assigned the role of dictator decide how to divide their joint earnings. We find that advantaged dictators keep more for themselves than disadvantaged dictators and report different fairness views and beliefs about task performance, but not different beliefs about social norms. Further, only fairness views play a significant mediating role between status and allocation differences, suggesting this is the primary mechanism underlying self-serving differences in support for redistribution.
Keywords:
redistribution; self-serving bias; fairness; norms; online experiments;
JEL-Classification:
C91; D63; D83;
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Discussion Paper No. 379
February 2, 2023
Trade and Regional Economic Development
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A central argument for trade liberalization is that when the `gains from trade' are shared, countries see large gains in economic development. In this paper, I empirically evaluate this argument and assess the impact of elite capture on regional development. Africa provides a unique study ground because the arbitrary placement of country borders during the colonial period partitioned hundreds of ethnic groups across borders. This partitioning is a source of variation in population heterogeneity and cross-country connectedness that is independent of economic considerations. Thus, African borders provide both a credible instrument for bilateral trade flows and enable the assignment of trade flows ---and their impacts--- to individuals. I find that while ethnic networks increase trade flows, increased trade activity decreases subnational economic development when measured by satellite data or individual wealth. I show that this counter-intuitive result comes from elite groups capturing the gains from trade, with detrimental impacts on trust and democratic progress in society.
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JEL-Classification: