Discussion Paper No. 398
May 26, 2023
Committee Deliberation and Gender Differences in Influences
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Abstract:
This paper provides empirical evidence on the aggregation of information in committees. We analyze unique data from the decision-making process of hiring committees within a large private company. In the hiring process, committee members first conduct independent one-to-one interviews and give individual recommendations before deliberating on a collective hiring decision. We find that committees’ final hiring decisions are systematically less aligned with the initial recommendations of women than with those of men, even though women and men are equally qualified and experienced. This disparity in influence is strongest when recommendations exhibit high disagreement and when a single woman deliberates with two men. The estimated distribution of influence reveals that almost all men are more influential than the median woman. We offer suggestive evidence that these findings have implications for the effectiveness of gender quotas.
Keywords:
committee decision-making; gender differences; hiring;
JEL-Classification:
D71; J16; M51;
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Discussion Paper No. 397
May 15, 2023
Management and Performance in the Public Sector: Evidence from German Municipalities
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Abstract:
We study management practices and performance in a representative sample of German municipalities, which provide the bulk of direct administrative services for citizens and firms in Germany. Surveyed municipalities differ substantially in their use of structured management practices, and this heterogeneity is also pronounced within all federal states, regional types, and population size brackets. Moreover, we document a systematic positive relationship between the degree of structured management and a diverse set of performance measures capturing municipalities' attractiveness for citizens and firms. Topic modelling (LDA) of survey responses suggests that the predominant management style is to use relatively little structured management.
Keywords:
management practices; public sector organizations; local government; municipal performance; state capacity; World Management Survey (WMS);
JEL-Classification:
D20; D73; H11; H73; R50;
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Discussion Paper No. 396
Antitrust and (Foreign) Innovation: Evidence from the Xerox Case
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Abstract:
How does antitrust enforcement against patent-based monopolies affect innovation? I address this question by empirically studying the US antitrust case against Xerox, the monopolist in the market for plain-paper copiers. In 1975, Xerox was ordered to license all its copier-technology patents in the US and abroad. I show that this promoted innovation by other firms in the copier industry, measured by a disproportionate increase in patenting in technologies where Xerox patents became available for licensing. This positive effect is driven by increased innovation by Japanese competitors. They started developing smaller desktop copiers and their innovation became more diverse.
Keywords:
antitrust; innovation; patents; compulsory licensing; Japan; Xerox;
JEL-Classification:
O30; O34; L41; K21;
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Discussion Paper No. 395
Pay Transparency in Organizations
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Abstract:
I study when a firm prefers to be transparent about pay using a simple multidimensional signaling model. Pay transparency within the firm means that a worker can learn about his own worker-firm match from another worker’s pay. This can either encourage or discourage workers—which affects retention—and so creates a trade-off for the firm when it commits to a level of transparency. The model pre- dicts that when few workers have a high worker-firm match, transparency is always preferred by the firm and becomes more favorable as the value of retaining these ‘star’ workers increases. This prediction is consistent with the firms in the field that choose to be internally transparent about pay. The model also predicts that transparency leads to pay compression, again consistent with evidence from the field.
Keywords:
pay transparency; bonus pay; multidimensional signaling; relative pay;
JEL-Classification:
D82; D86; J30; M52;
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Discussion Paper No. 394
Communicating Preferences to Improve Recommendations
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Abstract:
I study a cheap talk model between a buyer and a seller with two goods for sale. There is two-sided (independent) private information with sequential, two-way communication. In the first stage, the buyer communicates her private preferences to the seller. In the second stage, the seller communicates the quality of the goods to the buyer. When the buyer’s preference is about which attribute common to both goods she prefers, the seller strictly benefits from the buyer communicating her preferences. Whereas when the buyer’s preference is about which good she prefers, this is never the case.
Keywords:
cheap talk; strategic communication; product recommendations;
JEL-Classification:
D82; L15;
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Discussion Paper No. 393
May 9, 2023
Layoffs and Productivity at a Bangladeshi Sweater Factory
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Abstract:
Conflicts between management and workers are common and can have significant impacts on productivity. Combining ethnographic, survey and administrative records from a large Bangladeshi sweater factory, we study how workers responded to management’s decision to lay off about a quarter of the workers following a period of labor unrest. Our main finding is that the mass layoff resulted in a large and persistent reduction in the productivity of surviving workers. Moreover, it is specifically the firing of peers with whom workers likely had social connections - friends - that matters. Additional evidence on defect rates suggests a deliberate shading of performance by workers in order to punish the factory’s management.
Keywords:
layoffs; productivity; morale; relational contracts;
JEL-Classification:
J50; M50; O12;
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Discussion Paper No. 392
March 30, 2023
Rebate Rules in Reward-Based Crowdfunding: Introducing the Bid-Cap Rule
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Abstract:
We study the efficacy of rebate rules in reward-based crowdfunding, where a project is only realized when a funding goal is met, and only those who pledge at least a reservation price receive a reward from the project. We propose and experimentally test two rebate rules against the customary all-or-nothing model. Firstly, we adapt the proportional rebate rule from threshold public good games to our reward-based setting. Secondly, we develop the novel bid-cap rule. Here, pledges must only be paid up to a cap, which is determined ex-post such that the provision point is exactly met. Theoretically, the bid-cap rule induces weakly less variance in payments compared with the proportional rebate rule. In our experiment, we find that both rebate rules induce higher pledges and increase the project realization rate in comparison to the all-or-nothing model. Further, we can confirm that the variance of payments is lower under the bid-cap rule compared with the proportional rebate rule.
Keywords:
crowdfunding; laboratory experiment; provision point mechanism; rebates;
JEL-Classification:
C72; C92; H41;
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Discussion Paper No. 391
March 29, 2023
On the (Ir)Relevance of Fee Structures in Certification
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Abstract:
Restrictions on certifiers’ fee structures are irrelevant for maximizing their profits and trade efficiency, and for the implementability of (monotone) distributions of rents. The irrelevance results exploit that certification schemes involve two substitutable dimensions—the fee structure and the disclosure rule—and adaptations in the disclosure dimension can mitigate restrictions on the fee dimension. While restrictions on fee structures do affect market transparency, it has no impact on economic efficiency or rent distributions.
Keywords:
certification; fee structures; disclosure rules; transparency;
JEL-Classification:
D82;
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Discussion Paper No. 390
March 16, 2023
Can Grassroots Organizations Reduce Support for Right-Wing Populism via Social Media?
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Abstract:
The rise of right-wing populism throughout Western democracies coincided with an increasing adoption of social media – both among supporters and opponents of right-wing populism alike. In light of these trends, we assess whether grassroots organizations are effective in combating right-wing populism via social media. We study this question using a tightly controlled online field experiment embedded in the Facebook campaign of a German grassroots organization. Leveraging geo-spatial variation in where the organization disseminated its Facebook ads targeting Germany’s leading right-wing populist party (AfD), we find that the campaign did not significantly affect the AfD’s vote share and turnout. Drawing on data from a complementary online experiment, we show that insufficient outreach on Facebook together with the absence of individual-level responses of attitudes and behavior explains why the campaign did not meaningfully shape aggregate election outcomes.
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JEL-Classification:
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Discussion Paper No. 389
February 27, 2023
“No Man is an Island”: An Empirical Study on Team Formation and Performance
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Abstract:
Do self-formed teams perform better than other team structures? Using unique data from Virgo, a Nobel-prize-winning scientific organization with self-formed teams, first, I uncover new evidence on team formation and performance. Then, I develop a structural model to i) estimate which teams perform better controlling for self-formation and ii) evaluate the performance of counterfactual team structures. Regarding i), estimation results show that small teams perform better than large teams. Regarding ii), counterfactual results show that randomly formed teams perform worse than the observed self-formed teams, and teams with a more diverse membership perform better.
Keywords:
teamwork; entry game; structural estimation; knowledge production; organizational economics;
JEL-Classification:
C57; C72; L02; M50; O32;