Preliminary Program of the Conference on

"Designing and Evaluating Matching Markets"

June 27–28, 2019

Organizers:

Inácio Bó
WZB Berlin Social Science Center

Lars Ehlers
University of Montreal

Dorothea Kübler
WZB Berlin Social Science Center
### Thursday, June 27, 2019

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<td>9.15 – 9.30</td>
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<td>9.30 – 10.50</td>
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|            | Camille Terrier (University of Lausanne)  
|            | The Design of Teacher Assignment: Theory and Evidence |
|            | Christian Basteck (Université libre de Bruxelles)  
|            | Aiding Applicants: Leveling the Playing Field within the Immediate Acceptance Mechanism |
| 10.50 – 11.20| Coffee Break            |
| 11.20 – 12.40| **Session 2**            |
|            | Utku M. Ünver (Boston College)  
|            | Efficient and Incentive-Compatible Liver Exchange |
|            | Agnes Cseh (Hungarian Academy of Sciences)  
|            | Pareto optimal coalitions of fixed size |
| 12.40 – 14.00| Lunch                   |
| 14.00 – 15.20| **Session 3**            |
|            | Morimitsu Kurino (Keio University)  
|            | Designing market structure in matching problems |
|            | Lars Ehlers (Université de Montréal)  
|            | Robust Design in Monotonic Markets: A Case for Firm-Proposing Deferred-Acceptance |
| 15.20 – 15.50| Coffee Break            |
15.50 – 17.10 **Session 4**

*Caterina Calsamiglia* (Institute of Political Economy and Governance (IPEG))
The design of university entrance exams and its implications for gender gaps

*Madhav Raghavan* (University of Lausanne)
Transparency of Centralised Allocation Mechanisms

18.30 Conference Dinner - by Invitation Only (Renger Patzsch)

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**Friday, June 28, 2019**

9.30 – 10.50 **Session 5**

*Julien Grenet* (Paris School of Economics)
Decentralizing Centralized Matching Markets: Implications from Early Offers in University Admissions

*Ran Shorrer* (Penn State University)
Simultaneous Search: Beyond Independent Successes

10.50 – 11.20 Coffee Break

11.20 – 12.40 **Session 6**

*Rustamdjan Hakimov* (University of Lausanne)
Pick-an-object mechanisms

*Thilo Klein and Robert Aue* (ZEW)
Gains from Integration in School Choice

12.40 – 14.00 Lunch

14.00 – 15.20 **Session 7**

*Alexander Nesterov* (Higher School of Economics, St.Petersburg)
Minimal envy and popular matchings

*Marek Pycia* (University of Zurich)
Invariance and Matching Market Outcomes

15.20 – 15.50 Coffee Break
15.50 – 17.10 **Session 8**

*M. Oguz Afacan* (Sabanci University)
College Admissions with Tuition Transfers

*Bettina Klaus* (University of Lausanne)
Serial Dictatorship Mechanisms with Reservation Prices

18.30 Farewell Dinner (Schleusenkrug)